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IF ROE WERE OVERRULED: ABORTION AND THE 
CONSTITUTION IN A POST-ROE WORLD 
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR.* 
INTRODUCTION 
What would be the legal and constitutional consequences if the Supreme 
Court were to overrule Roe v. Wade?1  Where would the power to regulate 
abortions lie, and what constitutional restrictions on regulatory authority, if 
any, would exist?  Would abortion questions vanish from the courts, or would 
new constitutional questions arise?  If the latter, would those questions be hard 
or easy, and how similar or dissimilar would they be to the questions presented 
in Roe and its progeny?  In the ongoing discussion about whether Roe will or 
ought to be overruled, these potentially important questions have received less 
attention than they deserve.  In exploring them, my purpose is not to judge 
whether Roe v. Wade was correctly decided or whether the Supreme Court now 
should overrule it.  I want only to consider what the constitutional landscape 
would look like if the Court were to consign Roe to the ashbin of history. 
Although both my inquiry and my conclusions are intended to be 
analytical, not normative, I want to make a point, or a series of points, aimed at 
correcting what seem to me to be four widespread fallacies—certainly among 
the general public, and to some extent even among lawyers and judges.  First, 
many people assume that a Supreme Court decision overruling Roe v. Wade 
would essentially wipe the legal slate clean and frame only prospective issues 
about whether the states should adopt new statutes regulating abortion.2  This 
 
* Ralph S. Tyler, Jr. Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School.  I am grateful to 
Charles Fried, Jack Goldsmith, Joel Goldstein, Dan Meltzer, Martha Minow, Gerry Neuman, 
Matthew Price, and Joe Singer for extremely helpful comments on earlier drafts, and to all the 
formal and informal commentators when a version of this Article was delivered as the Childress 
Lecture at Saint Louis University School of Law on October 13, 2006.  Sam Walsh and Martin 
Kurzweil provided superb research assistance. 
 1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 2. See, e.g., William Baude, Op-Ed, States of Confusion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2006, § 4, at 
17 (“[I]n the absence of Roe, states would largely be free to regulate [abortion] as they saw fit.  
Some states would permit abortion on demand, while some would ban it; many would fall 
somewhere in between.”); Linda Chavez, Editorial, Hysteria Over Abortion Blinds Dems to 
Reason, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Nov. 4, 2005, at A7 (“A reversal on Roe v. Wade would simply 
turn the issue of abortion back to the states. . . . [A]fter more than 30 years of virtually unfettered 
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is false.  In a number of states, statutes enacted prior to the decision of Roe in 
1973 remain on the books.  Where this situation obtains, the old laws would 
sometimes, perhaps typically, become operative and enforceable unless 
repealed.  Indeed, it is imaginable that officials in some states might attempt to 
enforce pre-Roe anti-abortion strictures retroactively against conduct that 
occurred when Roe v. Wade was the law of the land.  If so, the resulting legal 
issues would not all be easy ones. 
A second fallacy involves the notion that an overruling of Roe v. Wade 
would necessarily return responsibility for abortion regulation to the states.3  If 
Congress so chose, it could either forbid or protect abortion on a nation-wide 
basis.  State control would exist only insofar as Congress chose to tolerate it. 
A third fallacy is that absent action by Congress, no significant 
constitutional issues about state power to regulate abortion would remain.4  In 
a phrase, the courts could escape the abortion wars.  This is perhaps the most 
important fallacy about the consequences of a decision to overrule Roe, and the 
one with which I am most concerned.  A measure of the prominence of this 
fallacy, even among legal elites, comes from its encouragement by no less 
 
access to abortion, it is unlikely that many states would pass restrictive laws.”); Carolyne Zinko, 
An Ideological Rumble; The Abortion Issue: Public Opinion Is Polarized and Bitter Long After 
Roe vs. Wade Ruling, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 8, 2006, at A1 (“Many assume that if the Supreme Court 
reversed Roe vs. Wade and sent the issue back to the states, individual states would have to pass 
new legislation to ban abortions . . . .” (quoting CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS., WHAT IF ROE FELL?: 
THE STATE-BY-STATE CONSEQUENCES OF OVERTURNING ROE V. WADE 1 (2004), 
http://www.crlp.org/pdf/bo_whatifroefell.pdf)). 
 3. See, e.g., Clarke D. Forsythe & Stephen B. Presser, The Tragic Failure of Roe v. Wade: 
Why Abortion Should Be Returned to the States, 10 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 85, 93 (2005) (“[T]he 
issue should be returned to the states.  When that is done, the American people themselves, 
through their elected representatives, will be able to exercise local control over abortion and to 
consider the entire impact of abortion on women, their health, and relationships.”); Susan Estrich, 
The Likely Tie-breaker on Abortion? Not Alito, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 29, 2006, at 1P 
(“Even if [Justice Anthony] Kennedy were to vote against Roe, the battle wouldn’t end.  It would 
just shift to the states, allowing each one to decide what rights, if any, women would have to 
choose abortion.”); Eyal Press, My Father’s Abortion War, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2006, § 6 
(Magazine), at 57 (“Not a few commentators lately, including some who support abortion rights, 
have suggested that it would not be the worst thing if the availability of abortion were left to state 
legislatures to decide, which is what will happen if Roe is overturned.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Jonathan Last, Editorial, Next Step: Scrapping ‘Roe’, PHIL. INQUIRER, Mar. 12, 
2006, at D5 (“[I]f Roe v. Wade is overturned, abortion does not disappear or suddenly become 
illegal—it simply reverts to the states, where elected officials can make, and change, abortion 
laws according to the will of the people.”); Fred Mann, Abortion Fight May Move to States, 
WICHITA EAGLE, Jan. 22, 2006, at 1B (quoting Richard Levy, a University of Kansas 
constitutional law professor, as saying: “[Overturning Roe] would mean states are free to regulate 
abortions however they might choose”); Bruce Nolan, Groups Paint Picture of Post-Roe 
Landscape, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, July 24, 2005, at 1 (“[Reversal of Roe] would 
almost certainly pitch abortion into state legislatures to be protected, regulated or banned as local 
forces saw fit . . . .”). 
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estimable an analyst than Justice Antonin Scalia.  Writing in partial dissent in 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,5 in which the 
Supreme Court majority reaffirmed the essential holding of Roe v. Wade, 
Justice Scalia not only deplored that Roe had “inflamed our national politics,” 
but also appeared to promise that by overruling Roe the Court could get itself 
out of “the abortion-umpiring business.”6  However alluring the prospect of a 
judicial retreat from the abortion wars otherwise might be, any hope that the 
Court could achieve a total respite from abortion issues is naïve.7  If Roe were 
overruled, it is true that there would be little doubt about the states’ power to 
prohibit abortions within their territorial jurisdictions (in the absence of 
national legislation enacted by Congress), at least unless some states went 
further than the pre-Roe regulatory norm and attempted to ban abortions that 
were necessary to preserve the life of the mother.  It is likely, however, that 
some states would impose further restrictions, including prohibitions against 
travel by their citizens for the purpose of obtaining out-of-state abortions.  If 
so, very serious constitutional questions would arise—and, somewhat 
ironically, a central issue for the Supreme Court would likely be whether the 
states’ interest in preserving fetal life is weighty enough to justify them in 
regulating abortions that occur outside their borders.  Too, some right-to-life 
states might attempt to prohibit speech within their borders that encourage 
pregnant women who wished to terminate their pregnancies to seek abortions 
in states that permit them.8  If so, the resulting First Amendment issues could 
require the Court to weigh state interests in discouraging abortion against the 
competing interests of women in obtaining abortion-related information. 
A fourth fallacy is that the overruling of Roe v. Wade could be a relatively 
discrete decision that would pose no threat to the surrounding body of cases 
upholding fundamental rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses.9  No matter how narrowly a decision overruling Roe might be written, 
 
 5. 505 U.S. 833, 979–1002 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 6. Id. at 995–96. 
 7. Cf. id. at 943 n.12 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, 
and dissenting in part) (“Justice Scalia is uncharacteristically naive if he thinks that overruling 
Roe . . . will enable the Court henceforth to avoid reviewing abortion-related issues.”). 
 8. In Bigelow v. Virginia, the Supreme Court invalidated a Virginia statute which 
prohibited abortion advertising.  421 U.S. 809 (1975).  The overruling of Roe v. Wade, should it 
occur, would leave significant questions about  Bigelow’s continuing viability.  For discussion, 
see infra notes 116–29 and accompanying text. 
 9. Charles Fried advanced this argument while arguing before the Supreme Court in 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).  See Transcript of Oral 
Arguments Before Court on Abortion Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1989, at B12 (“[W]e are not 
asking the Court to unravel the fabric of unenumerated and privacy rights . . . which this Court 
has woven. . . . Rather, we are asking the Court to pull this one thread.”); see also CHARLES 
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there could be no guarantee against ripple effects in future cases challenging 
other Supreme Court precedents. 
In exploring widespread but by no means ubiquitous misunderstandings 
about the effects of a possible Supreme Court decision to overrule Roe v. 
Wade, I shall develop two principal themes.  First, as I have asserted already, 
an overruling of Roe would not withdraw abortion-related questions from the 
courts, but instead would present the Court with a new set of morally freighted 
questions to replace the older set that has now grown familiar.  Second, among 
the constitutional issues that would emerge in the wake of an overruling of Roe 
v. Wade would be acute and sensitive ones involving the respective meanings 
of state and national citizenship as state efforts to stop abortion bumped up 
against freedoms long associated with unitary nationhood. 
I.  IDENTIFYING THE LEGAL BASELINE IN A POST-ROE WORLD 
Many people appear to think that a decision overruling Roe would leave 
Congress and the states with a blank slate on which to write with respect to 
abortion legislation: The state laws that fell when the Supreme Court decided 
Roe in 1973 would remain in the graveyard in which the Court interred them, 
and although state legislatures could regulate the future with a free hand, the 
burden of inertia would lie with those seeking to restrict abortions.10  The 
reality is otherwise. The overruling of Roe would revitalize pre-existing 
abortion prohibitions in a number of states.  In addition, overruling Roe would 
create potential legal issues about whether women and doctors could be 
sanctioned under pre-1973 statutes for actions in which they engaged prior to 
Roe v. Wade’s being overruled. 
A. Status of Pre-Roe Anti-Abortion Statutes 
When Roe was decided in 1973, all fifty states had some form of abortion 
regulation, and thirty-one states forbade abortion in all circumstances except to 
save the life of the mother.11  An important question involves the legal status of 
the pre-Roe statutes if Roe should be overruled.  Although many states 
formally repealed their old abortion laws in the years after Roe, seventeen 
states currently have laws on their books that would forbid nearly all 
abortions.12  Contrary to the expectations of most non-lawyers, the old statutes 
 
FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION—A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 75–
76 (1991). 
 10. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 11. See Forsythe & Presser, supra note 3, at 94 & n.35. 
 12. According to the Center for Reproductive Rights, there are four states with pre-Roe 
abortion laws that have never been enjoined by any court.  CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS., supra note 2, 
at 8.  Eleven additional states have never repealed pre-Roe statutes.  Id. at 10.  Two more states 
have adopted new statutory restrictions on abortion in the anticipation of Roe being overruled.  Id. 
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would spring back to life in any state in which subsequent legislation has not 
expressly or impliedly repealed them.  When a federal court, including the 
Supreme Court, holds a law to be unconstitutional, it does not excise the 
legislation from the statute books, but only signals that it will not permit the 
law to be enforced.  Once an overruling of Roe v. Wade lifted the bar to 
enforcement, previously enacted state laws forbidding abortion would regain 
their vitality as soon as any judicial injunctions that now bar their enforcement 
were lifted. 
A nice illustration of the underlying legal principle emerges from the so-
called Legal Tender Cases, in which the Supreme Court first held that the 
Legal Tender Act of 1862, which authorized the use of paper money to pay all 
debts public and private, was constitutionally invalid as applied to obligations 
created before the Act’s passage,13 but then reversed itself less than two years 
later.14  In its overruling decision, the Court made clear there was no need for 
Congress to reenact the Legal Tender Act.15  The legislation remained on the 
statute books and thus eligible for enforcement once the Supreme Court 
corrected its constitutional error.  Although the Legal Tender Act was a federal 
rather than a state statute, a federal court has no more authority to bar 
enforcement of a state statute that accords with the currently authoritative 
understanding of the Constitution than it has to deny enforcement to a federal 
statute that it once erroneously held to be unenforceable.16 
It is possible to imagine a constitutional challenge to this conclusion.  In an 
article written more than a decade ago, William Treanor and Gene Sperling 
argued that if the Supreme Court were to overturn Roe, it should recognize an 
exception to the usual rule that state legislation can be enforced after a judicial 
decision barring its enforcement has been reversed.17  But I doubt that the 
 
 13. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 626 (1869). 
 14. Knox v. Lee (The Legal Tender Cases), 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 553 (1870).  In the 
interim, two new Justices had been appointed to the Court, and their votes sufficed to reverse the 
previous 5-3 majority.  Kenneth W. Dam, The Legal Tender Cases, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 367, 377 
(1981). 
 15. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 552–53. 
 16. This conclusion reflects the long-settled rules that a court must apply the law as it exists 
at the time of decision, not as it existed previously, see, for example, United States v. Schooner 
Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801), and that Supreme Court decisions overruling previous 
decisions ordinarily apply retroactively as well as prospectively, see, for example, Harper v. Va. 
Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993).  State courts have overwhelmingly reached the same 
conclusion.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Badgett v. Lee, 22 So. 2d 804, 806 (Fla. 1945); Pierce v. 
Pierce, 46 Ind. 86, 95 (1874).  Commentators have reached this conclusion as well.  See William 
Michael Treanor & Gene B. Sperling, Prospective Overruling and the Revival of 
“Unconstitutional” Statutes, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1902, 1915 (1993) (collecting authorities). 
 17. Treanor & Sperling, supra note 16.  Among their arguments were that a Supreme Court 
decision that rendered a statute unenforceable might have rendered it impossible to muster 
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Supreme Court could recognize such an exception even if it wanted to do so.  
The Court has no constitutional authority to stop the states from enforcing 
validly enacted state laws that do not violate the Constitution, at least insofar 
as those laws are applied only to conduct occurring after a repealing decision 
so that no party could claim a lack of fair notice.18 
To put the point more directly, under current constitutional jurisprudence I 
think the conclusion is unavoidable that a decision to overrule Roe would 
return a number of states to the statutory state of affairs that existed prior to 
Roe v. Wade and prior to the dawning of the movement for women’s rights of 
which Roe was a part—at least as far as the federal Constitution is concerned.  
This last qualification is potentially important because a decision by the 
Supreme Court to overrule Roe v. Wade would likely thrust new, hotly charged 
issues of state law onto the dockets of state supreme courts in a number of 
states.  One obvious question for state courts would be whether their state 
constitutions possibly recognize abortion rights that the federal Constitution 
would cease to protect if Roe were overruled.19  In some states, state courts 
would also need to decide whether state legislation enacted since 1973 that did 
not expressly repeal pre-Roe anti-abortion laws might have done so 
impliedly.20  The question whether a later state statute has impliedly repealed 
an earlier one is a question of state law on which state courts would have the 
final word. 
B. “Retroactive” Enforcement of Pre-Roe Statutes 
Once it is recognized that Roe v. Wade removed no state anti-abortion laws 
from the statute books, but only decreed them to be unenforceable, another 
question that would arise upon the overruling of Roe is whether states with pre-
Roe anti-abortion statutes could enforce those statutes retroactively, against 
conduct that occurred while Roe v. Wade remained the controlling Supreme 
Court pronouncement.  This would be a question of surprising intricacy. 
Under the regime of Roe v. Wade, federal courts have issued injunctions 
barring the enforcement of state anti-abortion legislation in nearly all states.  
Interestingly, there are at least four states in which injunctions have not been 
issued,21 presumably because everyone took it for granted that state laws 
contrary to Roe could not be enforced even in the absence of a judicial decree 
 
support to repeal the statute that otherwise could have been repealed and that reliance interests 
might also have developed.  Id. at 1917–38. 
 18. For discussion of the fair notice issues that would be occasioned by the retroactive 
application of a statute once held unconstitutional, see infra notes 21–43 and accompanying text. 
 19. According to the Center for Reproductive Rights, state courts have recognized state 
constitutional protections for abortion rights in nineteen states.  CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS., supra 
note 2, at 12. 
 20. See id. at 9 (discussing implied repeal). 
 21. Id. at 8. 
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to that effect.  I shall discuss the special questions that might arise in those 
states below.  In most states, however, doctors have performed abortions and 
women have procured them under the protection of specifically applicable 
judicial orders enjoining prosecutions for acts protected by Roe v. Wade.  
Surely these doctors could not be prosecuted for engaging in conduct protected 
by a judicial injunction—or could they? 
Perhaps surprisingly, Supreme Court authority leaves the answer to this 
question less than clearly settled.  A ground for uncertainty arises from a 
dictum in Dombrowski v. Pfister,22 a 1965 case in which the Court enjoined the 
enforcement of a state statute under the First Amendment overbreadth 
doctrine.23  In order to rule a statute unconstitutionally overbroad, a court must 
first ascertain its breadth or meaning.  Somewhat awkwardly for a federal 
court, the meaning of a state statute is a question of state law, ultimately within 
the authority of state rather than federal courts to decide.24  In Dombrowski, the 
Supreme Court thus acknowledged the possibility that a state court, in a suit 
for a declaratory judgment, might provide a “narrowing construction” of the 
law that it had found to be overbroad and thus reveal the challenged statute not 
to be overbroad after all.25  If that circumstance should materialize, the Court 
said, then the injunction that it had ordered should be vacated and prosecutions 
under the statute could resume, at least for conduct that occurred after the 
narrowing construction was obtained.26  With respect to the possible 
prosecution of conduct occurring during the pendency of a federal injunction, 
the Court said this: “Our cases indicate that once an acceptable limiting 
construction is obtained, it may be applied to conduct occurring prior to the 
construction, provided such application affords fair warning to the 
defendants.”27 
This cryptic and ambiguous pronouncement—addressed to a situation at 
least partly analogous to that which would exist if a state were to attempt to 
prosecute conduct occurring under cover of a federal injunction enforcing Roe 
v. Wade—reflects two competing considerations.  On the one hand, the 
Dombrowski dictum acknowledges the Justices’ uncertainty that the federal 
judiciary could have any lawful authority to bar the states from enforcing what 
the Supreme Court ultimately comes to recognize as a constitutionally valid 
 
 22. 380 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 23. On the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, see generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853 (1991). 
 24. See generally David L. Shapiro, State Courts and Federal Declaratory Judgments, 74 
NW. U. L. REV. 759 (1979) (discussing issues confronting federal courts asked to enjoin state 
statutes or hold them unconstitutional). 
 25. Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 483. 
 26. Id. at 490–92 & n.7; see also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 115 (1990) (citing 
Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 491 n.7). 
 27. Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 491 n.7 (citations omitted). 
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state statute.  On the other hand, there is a concern about fair warning to 
criminal defendants. 
Although Dombrowski equivocated concerning which of these 
considerations would prevail in a case of conflict, I find it difficult to imagine 
that the Justices ever would, or should, permit the criminal prosecution of 
conduct that occurred under the protection of a judicial injunction reflecting 
then-controlling Supreme Court precedent.  In recent years, the Court has 
maintained, sometimes stridently, that its pronouncements on constitutional 
issues are the “supreme law of the land” and must, accordingly, be accepted as 
binding by all others.28  It is virtually unimaginable that the Court could find 
that citizens who relied on judicial injunctions, issued pursuant to the judicially 
declared supreme law, could subsequently be held to have done so at risk of 
criminal prosecution if the Supreme Court should ever change its mind.29  The 
requirement of fair notice is appropriately strict in criminal prosecutions.30  
Even apart from the clear precedential authority of Roe v. Wade, there are 
strong arguments that a federal injunction necessarily provides an immunity 
against prosecution for conduct occurring under its protection, even if the 
injunction is later vacated as not warranted by law.31  The conferral of judicial 
 
 28. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958); see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 524 
(1997) (“The power to interpret the Constitution in a case or controversy remains in the 
Judiciary.”); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 868 (1992) (“Like the 
character of an individual, the legitimacy of the Court must be earned over time.  So, indeed, must 
be the character of a Nation of people who aspire to live according to the rule of law.  Their belief 
in themselves as such a people is not readily separable from their understanding of the Court 
invested with the authority to decide their constitutional cases and speak before all others for their 
constitutional ideals.”); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974) (“We therefore reaffirm 
that it is the province and duty of this Court ‘to say what the law is’. . . .” (quoting Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803))). 
 29. In the Dombrowksi context, by contrast, it is at least plausible to maintain that a person 
relying on a federal court declaration that a state statute is unconstitutionally overbroad must rely 
on a determination of state law with respect to which a federal court judgment does not 
necessarily reflect the supreme law of the land, since the meaning of state statutes is ultimately a 
question of state law to be resolved authoritatively by state courts. 
 30. See, e.g., Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313, 315–16 (1972) (holding that a defendant 
had no fair warning that his actions were proscribed when they would not have fallen within a 
statute’s prohibitory ambit prior to an unexpected judicial construction).  Beyond the 
constitutional requirement of fair notice, many states follow the Model Penal Code, which 
permits a defense of mistake of law when the defendant has reasonably relied on a judicial 
decision that is later deemed erroneous.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3)(b)(ii) (1962). 
 31. In Oklahoma Operating Co. v. Love, Justice Brandeis, in affirming the award of 
preliminary injunctive relief, asserted flatly and arguably dispositively that even if a challenged 
regulation should ultimately be upheld, “a permanent injunction should, nevertheless, issue to 
restrain the enforcement of penalties accrued pendente lite.”  252 U.S. 331, 337–38 (1920).  
Nevertheless, in Edgar v. MITE Corp., concurring and dissenting opinions skirmished over the 
related but distinct question whether preliminary relief entered by a federal court can immunize a 
plaintiff from prosecution for acts occurring after the injunction’s issuance if the statute is 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2007] IF ROE WERE OVERRULED 619 
power to resolve cases and controversies may imply a judicial capacity to grant 
relief with at least this much efficacy.32 
A different and more difficult question might be presented in civil rather 
than criminal proceedings predicated on actions taken in reliance on Roe that 
were not specifically protected by a federal injunction—either because an 
injunction was so written as to protect only the specific plaintiffs who had 
sought injunctive relief, and not an open class of all women and doctors within 
the state,33 or because the civil proceedings occurred in one of the states in 
which the courts never entered any injunction at all.34  Suppose that, under 
these circumstances, the father of a fetus brought a tort action, which was 
authorized by state law, against the woman or doctor who caused the fetus’s 
destruction.  Or suppose that a state sought to withdraw the medical licenses of 
doctors who were not specifically protected by Roe-based injunctions and who 
had notoriously furnished “abortion on demand” on the ground that such 
conduct revealed a disqualifying defect of medical judgment or personal 
character.  Would the defendants in these civil cases be entitled to rely on the 
defense that their actions were perfectly lawful under Roe v. Wade, even if Roe 
had subsequently been overruled? 
 
ultimately upheld as constitutionally valid in further proceedings or on appeal.  Compare 457 
U.S. 624, 648–49 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(maintaining that federal judges have no authority to confer immunity from prosecution under a 
statute ultimately determined to be constitutionally valid), with id. at 657 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (maintaining that “in the ordinary case . . . it should be presumed that an injunction 
secures permanent protection from penalties for violations that occurred during the period it was 
in effect”). 
 32. But cf. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 482 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) 
(maintaining that a federal declaratory judgment pronouncing a state statute constitutionally 
invalid would not constitute binding authority in a subsequent state court criminal action to 
enforce the statute). 
 33. For discussion of the pertinence of the distinction between class relief and relief 
specifically accorded only to named parties, see Shapiro, supra note 24, at 768–79.  To put the 
point in a nutshell, a non-party to a federal action that results in an injunction can subsequently 
invoke the precedential effect of the underlying federal judgment, but cannot successfully enter a 
claim of issue preclusion.  Id. 
 34. For purposes of brevity of exposition, I am here collapsing two issues into one.  One 
issue involves the pertinence of the criminal/civil distinction, the other the pertinence of the 
question whether conduct did or did not occur under the protection of a federal injunction.  Apart 
from interests of brevity, I frame the question this way because I am inclined to think both that 
(1) criminal prosecutions of conduct protected by Roe would be prohibited, see supra notes 28–
30 and accompanying text, and that (2) conduct protected by a federal injunction could not 
provide the basis for state impositions of civil sanctions of penalties reflecting a judgment that the 
conduct was legally culpable, see supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.  On these 
assumptions, the most challenging question would involve state attempts to impose civil liability 
or sanctions on abortion related activities prior to the overruling of Roe that were not specifically 
protected by a judicial injunction. 
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In civil cases, the Supreme Court has permitted the enactment and 
retroactive enforcement of regulatory legislation imposing duties that could not 
specifically have been anticipated at the time when pertinent conduct 
occurred.35  “[L]egislation readjusting rights and burdens is not unlawful solely 
because it upsets otherwise settled expectations,” the Court has said, “even 
though the effect . . . is to impose a new duty or liability based on past acts.”36  
The only question is whether the legislature has a rational basis for wanting to 
apply rules retroactively to conduct that occurred in the past.37 
In the case of changes of law resulting from revised judicial interpretations 
of the Constitution, whether or not new legislation is involved, the Court has 
recently insisted that even surprising decisions not only can, but must, apply 
retroactively.38  The Court’s stance on this issue has varied over time.  It once 
took the position that it possessed discretion to deny retroactive effect to 
decisions that reflected a sharp break with prior law and that had engendered 
strong reliance interests.39  Under this policy, a decision to overrule Roe, and 
thus to strip it of protective force for the future, would presumably not apply 
retroactively.  In recent years, however, the Court has recurrently rejected 
arguments that its decisions should apply prospectively only, even when those 
decisions would have been difficult to anticipate.40  Indeed, in Harper v. 
 
 35. See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 730–34 (1984); 
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16–18 (1976).  Although the Court occasionally 
asserts that retroactive legislation is disfavored, the only recent case actually to invalidate a 
retroactively applicable statute is Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel in which the plurality opinion 
relied on a “takings” rationale that would have no applicability to the retroactive enforcement of 
state anti-abortion rules.  524 U.S. 498, 532–36 (1998). 
 36. Usery, 428 U.S. at 16. 
 37. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 467 U.S. at 729 (asserting that “the strong deference” 
ordinarily accorded to regulatory legislation “is no less applicable when that legislation is applied 
retroactively”). 
 38. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993); James B. Beam 
Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 540 (1991). 
 39. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106–07 (1971) (laying down a test for 
determining whether new rules should apply retroactively in civil cases).  At the time when 
Chevron Oil was decided, the Court had already developed a parallel formula for determining 
whether to give retroactive effect to path-breaking decisions establishing new constitutional 
protections for defendants in criminal cases.  See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965) 
(declining to give retroactive effect to a path-breaking decision in a criminal case).  For 
discussion and criticism of the Court’s historical non-retroactivity practice, see Francis X. 
Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a Proposal, 61 VA. L. REV. 1557 
(1975); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731 (1991). 
 40. See, e.g., Harper, 509 U.S. at 97; James B. Beam Distilling Co., 501 U.S. at 537–38, 
540.  Reversing its earlier position, the Court has similarly held that once it has declared a rule of 
constitutional law in a criminal case, “the integrity of judicial review requires that we apply that 
rule to all similar cases pending on direct review.”  Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322–23 
(1987). 
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Virginia Department of Taxation,41 the Court said flatly that “[w]hen this 
Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule . . . must be 
given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all 
events, regardless of whether such events predate or postdate our 
announcement of the rule.”42 
Notwithstanding Harper’s seemingly categorical pronouncement, I would 
hesitate to state unequivocally that a decision overruling Roe v. Wade would 
eliminate any Roe-based defense in cases seeking to predicate civil damages or 
regulatory consequences on abortions performed prior to the overruling 
decision and not specifically protected by then-extant federal injunctions.  The 
Court could imaginably hold that the overruling of Roe would present “special 
circumstances,” not present in any of its other recent cases, justifying an 
exception to the rule laid down in Harper.43  At the very least, however, a 
decision to this effect would cut against the grain of the Court’s recent 
decisions asserting the necessary retroactivity of its constitutional decisions. 
C. Summary 
The argument that I have made so far could be summarized as follows: Roe 
v. Wade did not eliminate state laws barring abortion, but only established that 
those laws could not be enforced so long as Roe remained in force.  This is a 
subtle difference, but potentially an important one.  If Roe were overruled, the 
judicially enforced prohibition against state anti-abortion laws would 
disappear, not only for the future, but possibly also for at least some 
retrospective purposes. 
II.  POST-OVERRULING ABORTION REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT 
Many people appear to assume that a Supreme Court decision overruling 
Roe v. Wade would necessarily return responsibility for abortion regulation or 
non-regulation to the states.44  This is another fallacy.  Under current doctrines, 
 
 41. 509 U.S. 86. 
 42. Id. at 97. 
 43. See Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 755 (1995) (noting the possibility 
of arguments that “special circumstances” might justify a departure from Harper’s non-
retroactivity rule); see also Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 184–85 (1995) (observing that 
“whatever the continuing validity” of the once controlling Chevron Oil framework for assessing 
whether Supreme Court decisions should be applied retroactively in civil cases, the award of 
retroactive relief to the petitioner before the Court would not entail “the sort of grave disruption 
or inequity . . . that would bring that doctrine into play”). 
 44. See, e.g., Forsythe & Presser, supra note 3, at 93. 
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it seems likely that Congress would have the authority either to ban abortions 
or to protect abortion rights on a nation-wide basis.45 
For Congress to regulate abortion, it would need to find a source of 
authority in the text of the Constitution.46  Two candidates immediately 
suggest themselves, one of which is relatively implausible but the other almost 
certainly adequate.  The relatively implausible source of regulatory authority 
would be Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.47  If the Supreme Court 
overruled Roe in such a way as to establish that fetuses were persons in the 
constitutional sense, then Congress could presumably enact legislation 
pursuant to Section Five to prevent the states from denying fetuses the same 
protection that they give to other persons.48  It seems highly unlikely, however, 
that the Court would put a decision overruling Roe on this ground.49  Among 
other considerations, its doing so might well imply a state obligation to 
prohibit abortion in the same way that it prohibits other murders.50  Much more 
likely is that a Supreme Court that wished to overrule Roe would say that states 
have sufficiently powerful interests to justify their enactment of legislation 
protecting fetal life even if fetuses are not persons in the constitutional sense. 
If the fetuses are not persons in the constitutional sense, then any claim of 
congressional power to regulate abortion would presumably rest on the 
Commerce Clause.51  Under existing Commerce Clause doctrine, 
congressional power to regulate and thus to prohibit abortions would seem 
plain.  Abortions are services sold in interstate commerce, and the business of 
 
 45. Indeed, in 2003 Congress passed a law regulating so-called partial-birth abortions.  18 
U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. 2005). 
 46. See generally Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Does Congress Have the Constitutional Power to 
Prohibit Partial-Birth Abortion?, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 319 (2005) (analyzing congressional 
power to enact anti-abortion legislation under the Commerce Clause and Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
 47. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”). 
 48. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 520 (2004) (“Section 5 legislation is valid if it 
exhibits ‘a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and 
the means adopted to that end.’” (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997))). 
 49. As the Supreme Court noted in Roe v. Wade, the word “person” is generally used 
throughout the Constitution in ways that presuppose the occurrence of birth.  410 U.S. 113, 156–
58 (1973); see also Alec Walen, The Constitutionality of States Extending Personhood to the 
Unborn, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 161, 164–66 (2005) (outlining reasons not to view fetuses as 
persons in the constitutional sense). 
 50. Cf. Roe, 410 U.S. at 157 n.54 (“[T]he penalty for criminal abortion specified . . . is 
significantly less than the maximum penalty for murder . . . . If the fetus is a person, may the 
penalties be different?”). 
 51. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . .”). 
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providing medical care, including abortions, is intertwined with commerce in 
innumerable ways.52 
A complication could imaginably arise if an abortion provider sought to 
escape the reach of congressional regulatory power by making abortions 
available on a non-commercial basis.  The Supreme Court has linked 
Congress’s power to regulate activities that have a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce to the regulated activities’ commercial character.53  Even 
if an abortion provider offered its services free of charge, however, Congress’s 
regulatory power would appear to be clear under Gonzales v. Raich,54 which 
upheld Congress’s authority to regulate the non-commercial production and 
possession of medical marijuana based on the theory that marijuana is a 
commodity for which a commercial market exists.55  As it is with marijuana, so 
it would seemingly be with abortions: a generally applicable statute could be 
enforced even in cases that themselves lacked any commercial element.56 
 
 52. Congress thus relied on the Commerce Clause when it enacted the Freedom of Access to 
Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 (FACE), Pub. L. 103–259, 108 Stat. 694 (1994) (codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 248 (2000)), which prohibits intentionally injuring, intimidating, or physically 
interfering with anyone seeking reproductive healthcare services near a health care facility, and 
the courts of appeal have unanimously affirmed its authority to do so.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 1996) (upholding FACE as within Congress’s commerce power 
by virtue of its protection of people involved in interstate commerce and its regulation of conduct 
with a substantial effect on interstate commerce); United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 
1995) (same); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517 (11th Cir. 1995) (same). 
 53. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 
610–11 (2000). 
 54. 545 U.S. 1. 
 55. See id. at 18. 
 56. It is possible, of course, that a Supreme Court that was prepared to overrule Roe v. Wade 
would also be prepared to overrule Raich.  There were three dissenting votes in Raich, all coming 
from Justices conventionally tabbed as conservatives.  See id. at 42 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(joined in part by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J.); id. at 57 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Just as 
conservatives tend to be skeptical of Roe v. Wade, conservatives also tend to be hostile to the 
breadth of congressional regulatory power under the Commerce Clause that the Supreme Court 
recognized in Raich.  See, e.g., id. at 45 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The Constitution . . . does 
not tolerate reasoning that would ‘convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to 
a general police power of the sort retained by the States.’” (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549, 567 (1995))).  But so long as Commerce Clause doctrine remains substantially 
unaltered, we could have national legislation forbidding abortion if Congress chose to enact it. 
  Even if a Court overruling Roe did not also overrule Raich, any disposition by 
conservative Justices to support the position taken by the Raich dissents could imaginably give 
rise to a strangely ironic position if Congress enacted anti-abortion legislation and if a non-
commercial abortion provider claimed a constitutionally mandated exemption from the law.  If 
some conservative Justices adhered to the dissenting position in Raich that Congress lacked 
regulatory power, and if there were still some hold-out liberal Justices unwilling to renounce Roe, 
then the Justices holding those otherwise minority positions might coalesce to reach the 
conclusion that non-commercial abortion providers were exempt from prosecution under a federal 
anti-abortion statute. 
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A symmetrical conclusion would probably obtain if political majorities in 
Congress took a more tolerant view of abortion than some state legislatures 
and, instead of prohibiting abortions, sought to authorize them in at least some 
circumstances.  Congress might directly authorize the commercial delivery of 
abortion services pursuant to its commerce power.  Or it might establish a 
federal scheme for the licensing of doctors, license doctors to perform 
abortions under some or all circumstances, and forbid state interference with 
doctors in the performance of any medical function for which they were 
federally licensed.57  Either of these options would seem fairly clearly 
constitutional under current law. 
It is imaginable, of course, that a “conservative” Supreme Court that was 
prepared to overrule Roe might also be prepared to redefine and limit 
Congress’s commerce power to avoid this conclusion.58  Or the Court might 
achieve the same effect by, for example, defining the point at which a fetus 
becomes a person with a constitutionally protected right to life as a question 
primarily of state law in much the way that the existence of a constitutionally 
protected liberty or property interest can depend on state law.59  Building on 
this foundation, the Court might then say that Congress could not use its power 
under the Commerce Clause to authorize deliberate killings that state law 
would otherwise prohibit.  But a ruling to this effect would mark a 
considerable departure from current doctrine, under which state efforts to 
define persons cannot limit federal regulatory authority.  Accordingly, 
 
 57. It seems clear that Congress would have the power to establish such a scheme under the 
Commerce Clause.  For example, the federal Controlled Substances Act requires physicians to 
register with the Attorney General in order to prescribe most drugs.  21 U.S.C. §§ 823(b), (f) 
(2000).  It also allows the Attorney General to revoke a physician’s license if he or she “has 
committed such acts as would render his [or her] registration . . . inconsistent with the public 
interest.”  21 U.S.C. § 824(a)(4).  Attorney General John Ashcroft tested the limits of this 
congressionally conferred power by promulgating a regulation that characterized the prescription 
of federally controlled substances for the purpose of assisting suicide as “inconsistent with the 
public interest,” even if state law authorized such conduct.  Dispensing of Controlled Substances 
to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607, 56,608 (Nov. 9, 2001).  Although the Supreme Court 
found that this particular regulation lay beyond the scope of the powers delegated by Congress in 
Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 925 (2006), the Court affirmed that “[e]ven though 
regulation of health and safety is ‘primarily, and historically, a matter of local concern,’ there is 
no question that the Federal Government can set uniform national standards in these areas.”  Id. at 
923 (citation omitted) (quoting Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 
707, 719 (1985)). 
 58. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s 
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002) (identifying different strands of judicial 
conservatism and exploring their relationships to one another). 
 59. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & 
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 530–36 (5th ed. 2003) 
(discussing the relation of state and federal law in defining constitutionally protected liberty and 
property under the Due Process Clause). 
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although not wholly without trepidation, I would opine that if Congress can 
permissibly regulate the practice of medicine at all, then it can preempt state 
pro-life legislation that conflicts with its regulatory agenda.60 
With Congress almost certainly possessing the power to forbid abortion, 
and probably capable of protecting abortion rights as well, it is plain that the 
overruling of Roe would not necessarily return responsibility for abortion 
policy to the states.  Much more likely, the states would have authority to 
control the availability of abortion only at the sufferance of Congress. 
III.  THE PERMISSIBILITY OF STATE REGULATIONS INVOLVING ABORTION 
At least in the absence of federal regulation, many people appear to assume 
that the overruling of Roe v. Wade would eliminate the need for federal courts 
to assess the constitutionality of state anti-abortion legislation and, in 
particular, that it would necessarily eliminate the need for federal courts to 
assess the weight of state interests in protecting fetal life.61  Justice Scalia’s 
opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey appears 
to promise no less.62  But the assumption is fallacious if stated categorically.63  
Much would depend on the types of legislation that the states might enact in a 
post-Roe era. 
A. Regulations Threatening the Life of the Mother 
To begin with, a rather obvious constitutional question would present itself 
if one or more states in a post-Roe world were to enact anti-abortion 
prohibitions that included no exceptions whatsoever, even in cases in which 
abortion was necessary to protect the life of the mother.  The status of this and 
much other post-Roe anti-abortion legislation might well depend on exactly 
how a decision overruling Roe was written—a point that I have made passingly 
already and shall develop more fully below.  But one clear possibility would be 
for the Court to say that there is no “fundamental” right to abortion, because 
abortion rights are not firmly grounded either in the text of the Constitution or 
in a specific historical understanding of constitutional liberty, and accordingly 
 
 60. A federal regulatory scheme preempts state authority to regulate in a particular area if 
there is an express statement of preemption, if the federal scheme occupies the field, or if there 
are conflicts between the state and federal laws such that abiding by both is physically impossible 
or the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of congressional objectives.  See Pac. 
Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 203–04 
(1983).  See generally Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225 (2000). 
 61. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 62. 505 U.S. 833, 995–96 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 63. See id. at 943 n.12 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, 
and dissenting in part) (“State efforts to regulate and prohibit abortion in a post-Roe world 
undoubtedly would raise a host of distinct and important constitutional questions . . . .”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
626 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:611 
that the states may regulate abortions so long as they have a rational basis for 
doing so.64  If the Court took this line, the question arising from a prohibition 
against abortions necessary to save the life of the mother would be whether the 
mother’s interests become sufficiently fundamental in this context to override 
the state’s interest in fetal life or, probably more likely, whether a prohibition 
against abortions needed to save a mother’s life would survive rational basis 
review.  An argument that such a prohibition would fail rationality analysis 
could begin with the dissenting opinion of then-Justice William Rehnquist in 
Roe v. Wade itself.  Although Justice Rehnquist dissented from the majority’s 
decision to treat abortion as a fundamental right that could be infringed only to 
advance “compelling” governmental interests, he said flatly that if a statute 
“were to prohibit an abortion even where the mother’s life is in jeopardy, I 
have little doubt that . . . [the statutory prohibition] would lack a rational 
relationship to a valid state objective . . . .”65  But not all would necessarily 
reach the same conclusion within a rational basis framework.  It is thus quite 
imaginable that the Supreme Court would need to determine the 
constitutionality of abortions necessary to save the life of a mother. 
Moreover, if the Court were prepared to hold that abortion prohibitions 
went too far in cases in which a mother would otherwise die, it would likely 
also need to decide a number of closely related questions involving the precise 
location of the constitutional line.  If a state could not prohibit abortions 
necessary to save a woman from certain death even if Roe v. Wade were 
otherwise overruled, could a state ban abortions needed to prevent likely 
death?  Possible death?  Certainty of very serious damage to health?  
Likelihood of serious damage to health?  Unless a Court overruling Roe 
determined that the Constitution imposes no restrictions at all on a state’s 
authority to ban abortions within its borders, even with the life of the mother at 
stake, then line-drawing questions of this kind would potentially arise. 
B. Extraterritorial Regulation 
At least as likely to reach the Supreme Court if Roe should be overruled 
would be questions involving the constitutionality of legislation enacted in 
anti-abortion states attempting to bar women from traveling to pro-choice 
states to abort unwanted fetuses.  In 1972, the last year of the pre-Roe regime, 
roughly 40% of the women procuring abortions in the United States did so 
 
 64. Cf. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (asserting that substantive 
due process protection extends only to fundamental rights that, as carefully described, “are, 
objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,’ . . . and ‘implicit in the concept 
of ordered liberty.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325–26) 
(1937)). 
 65. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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outside their state of residence.66  If Roe were overruled, it thus seems likely, 
and is surely possible, that at least some states that prohibited abortion within 
their borders might attempt to use one or another regulatory tool to stop their 
citizens from traveling out of state to procure abortions of fetuses conceived 
within their territory.  Most straightforwardly, pro-life states might enact laws 
making it unlawful for their citizens to procure out-of-state as well as in-state 
abortions.67  Going a significant step further, a state that was serious about 
barring abortion as a means of protecting fetal life might even attempt to make 
it unlawful for out-of-state doctors to perform out-of-state abortions on the 
citizens of the regulating state, even within the territory of a state that 
permitted abortion. 
Numerous other state stratagems to discourage abortion are also 
imaginable, including restrictions on abortion advertising and abortion 
counseling, and I shall discuss some of them below.  But I start with the central 
case of a state criminal statute making it unlawful for citizens of that state to 
procure out-of-state as well as in-state abortions of fetuses conceived within 
the regulating state.  At least for non-lawyers, it is probably tempting to think 
that states can regulate conduct that occurs within their borders but not 
elsewhere.  But matters are not so simple.  In assessing the constitutionality of 
a state’s efforts to bar the out-of-state abortion of fetuses conceived within the 
state, the courts would need to work through a myriad of issues under a variety 
of constitutional provisions. 
1. The Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses 
In thinking about the issues that would be raised by a state law barring 
citizens of that state from procuring out-of-state abortions, I begin with the two 
provisions of the Constitution under which the courts have most frequently 
addressed so-called “choice of law” or “conflicts of law” issues, the Due 
Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses.  The Due Process Clause provides 
that no state may “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
 
 66. NANETTE J. DAVIS, FROM CRIME TO CHOICE 228 & table 10.1 (1985); see Seth F. 
Kreimer, The Law of Choice and Choice of Law: Abortion, the Right to Travel, and 
Extraterritorial Regulation in American Federalism, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 451, 453 (1992) 
(discussing statistics in Davis’s FROM CRIME TO CHOICE). 
 67. For discussion of whether such legislation would be constitutionally valid, see, for 
example, C. Steven Bradford, What Happens if Roe Is Overruled? Extraterritorial Regulation of 
Abortion by the States, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 87, 127 (1993); Lea Brilmayer, Interstate Preemption: 
The Right to Travel, the Right to Life, and the Right to Die, 91 MICH. L. REV. 873 (1993); Seth F. 
Kreimer, “But Whoever Treasures Freedom . . .”: The Right to Travel and Extraterritorial 
Abortions, 91 MICH. L. REV. 907 (1993) [hereinafter Kreimer, “But Whoever Treasures 
Freedom . . .”]; Kreimer, supra note 66, at 453; Gerald L. Neuman, Conflict of Constitutions? No 
Thanks: A Response to Professors Brilmayer and Kreimer, 91 MICH. L. REV. 939 (1993). 
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process of law.”68  The Full Faith and Credit Clause requires that “Full Faith 
and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial 
Proceedings of every other State.”69  Although these two clauses otherwise 
have quite different functions, the Supreme Court has generally assumed that 
they impose identical restrictions on states’ choice-of-law decisions about 
whether to apply their laws to events occurring out of state.70 
Suppose, to begin, that in a post-Roe world Utah had a law forbidding its 
citizens to procure abortions, whether in state or out of state, but California law 
permitted abortions.  Under these circumstances, it might be thought that either 
the Due Process Clause or the Full Faith and Credit Clause would require a 
Utah court as much as a California court to apply the California law, which 
permits abortion, in any criminal prosecution arising from an abortion 
performed in California.  In conflicts-of-laws terminology, the underlying 
intuition would be that legislative or regulatory jurisdiction both follows and is 
limited by territorial jurisdiction: the only state that can regulate conduct 
occurring within the United States is the state within which the conduct occurs. 
Echoing this intuition, some scholars have asserted categorically that any 
effort by a state to apply its criminal laws extraterritorially would violate the 
Constitution.71  Indeed, in support of this position, opponents of extraterritorial 
abortion regulation could point to Bigelow v. Virginia,72 in which the Supreme 
Court—just two years after its decision in Roe v. Wade—reversed Virginia’s 
conviction of a Virginia newspaper editor for printing an advertisement for an 
abortion referral service in New York.73  The Court wrote: 
The Virginia Legislature could not have regulated the advertiser’s activity in 
New York, and obviously could not have proscribed the activity in that State.  
Neither could Virginia prevent its residents from traveling to New York to 
obtain those services, or, as the state conceded, prosecute them for going there.  
 
 68. “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 69. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 70. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 n.10 (1981) (plurality opinion) 
(“This Court has taken a similar approach in deciding choice-of-law cases under both the Due 
Process Clause and Full Faith and Credit Clause.”); id. at 333 (Powell, J., dissenting) (applying 
the same test as the plurality and stating that “the Court has recognized that both the Due Process 
and Full Faith and Credit Clauses are satisfied if the forum has such significant contacts with the 
litigation that it has a legitimate state interest in applying its own law”); EUGENE F. SCOLES & 
PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 78–79 (2d ed. 1992). 
 71. See, e.g., ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 42 (3d ed. 1982) 
(“[N]o state may punish its citizen for what he does in the exclusive territorial jurisdiction of 
another state where what was done was lawful.”). 
 72. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
 73. Id. at 829. 
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Virginia possessed no authority to regulate the services provided in New 
York . . . .74 
Despite this language from Bigelow, which some scholars have argued is 
only dictum anyway,75 the categorical claim that states may never enact or 
enforce extraterritorial criminal legislation seems too strong.76  To see why, it 
may be useful to begin with Supreme Court decisions upholding the authority 
of states to apply their civil laws in lawsuits involving out-of-state events.  
Modern conflicts-of-law principles establish that a state’s regulatory 
jurisdiction depends on its “contacts” with or interests in a transaction, not 
necessarily on whether a transaction occurred within its territory.77  Within the 
resulting framework, “a set of facts giving rise to a lawsuit, or a particular 
issue within a lawsuit, may justify, in constitutional terms, the application of 
the law of more than one jurisdiction”—including the law of states that are 
geographically remote from the triggering events.78  The question is whether a 
state that wants to apply its law has “a significant contact or significant 
aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is 
neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”79 
In cases involving civil rather than criminal law, the Supreme Court has 
said repeatedly that an important consideration in assessing whether a state can 
 
 74. Id. at 822–24 (citations omitted). 
 75. Whether the above-quoted passage in Bigelow ought to be considered dictum is the 
subject of an intricate scholarly debate.  See Kreimer, supra note 66, at 459 n.27 (arguing the 
passage is not dictum); Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of 
America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 
MICH. L. REV. 1865, 1907 (1987) (arguing that language in Bigelow is dictum); see also Mark D. 
Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Heterogeneity in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. 
REV. 855, 955–64 (2002) (summarizing the debate and weighing in on the side of Regan). 
 76. See Bradford, supra note 67, at 127 (concluding that there is “little authority” to support 
the claim that the Constitution categorically bars extraterritorial application of state criminal 
laws); Rosen, supra note 75, at 963–64 (concluding that the Constitution does not bar states from 
regulating the conduct of their citizens who have traveled to evade state law). 
 77. See, e.g., Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (permitting the 
application of a state’s law based on “a significant contact . . . creating state interests, such that 
choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair”) (citations omitted). 
 78. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307 (1981) (plurality opinion).  In Hague, a 
Minnesota court applied substantive Minnesota law to the accidental death of a Wisconsin man 
on a Wisconsin road.  Id. at 305–06.  The Court found that Minnesota had sufficient contacts to 
justify application of its law because Hague held a job in Minnesota, because Allstate did 
business there, and because Hague’s spouse had subsequently moved to the state.  Id. at 319–20.  
The dissenters agreed that the forum state may sometimes apply its substantive law to an out-of-
state accident, but they disagreed with the conclusion that Minnesota’s contacts in this case 
established a sufficient state interest to apply its own law.  Id. at 336 (Powell, J., dissenting).  But 
see Shutts, 472 U.S. at 822 (denying application of the forum state law to class members who had 
no contacts with the forum state). 
 79. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 818 (quoting Hague, 449 U.S. at 313). 
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apply its laws to out-of-state events is whether one of its citizens was 
involved.80  In other words, a state has an enduring contact with its citizens and 
an interest in their well-being.  In the civil context, this contact would 
sometimes suffice to make a state’s enforcement of its law to regulate out-of-
state conduct neither arbitrary nor unfair.  In addition, a state might assert a 
contact or interest involving a fetus conceived within its borders.  Indeed, a 
pro-life state might even claim that the fetus was a person whose life it was 
entitled to protect. 
Bigelow to the contrary notwithstanding, there is reason to think that the 
Supreme Court would assess a state’s efforts to apply its criminal laws to out-
of-state events by employing a contacts-based framework similar to that which 
it employs in gauging the permissibility of a state’s application of its civil laws 
to transactions occurring out of state.  In several cases that Bigelow failed to 
cite, the Court has actually held that the states can apply their criminal laws 
extraterritorially, albeit under circumstances involving potentially 
distinguishable facts.81  Once the door is open to any extraterritorial extension 
of a state’s criminal jurisdiction, it becomes at least arguable that some kind of 
contact or interest-based analysis is necessary to distinguish permissible from 
 
 80. See, e.g., Hague, 449 U.S. at 318–19; Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 
66, 72 (1954); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 407–08 (1930); see also BMW of N. Am. v. 
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572 (1996) (holding that “a State may not impose economic sanctions on 
violators of its laws with the intent of changing tortfeasors’ lawful conduct in other States” and 
that “the economic penalties that a State . . . inflicts on those who transgress its laws . . . must be 
supported by the State’s interest in protecting its own consumers and its own economy”).  None 
of these cases says, however, that the citizenship or residence of one of the parties is necessarily 
sufficient to justify a state in applying its law to an out-of-state occurrence. 
 81. In Skiriotes v. Florida, Florida applied its criminal law to a Florida diver who, while 
outside of state waters, took marine sponges.  313 U.S. 69 (1941).  The Court concluded that 
states may regulate the conduct of their citizens on the high seas.  Id. at 73–74.  Although 
Skiriotes may not serve as controlling precedent for criminal conduct not on the high seas, it at 
least stands for the proposition that there is no formal bar to extraterritorial application of state 
criminal laws.  See Bradford, supra note 67, at 130–32.  Another Supreme Court case validating 
the extraterritorial application of state criminal law was Strassheim v. Daily.  221 U.S. 280 
(1911).  In Strassheim, the defendant, while in Illinois, allegedly bribed a Michigan state official 
to purchase used machinery and pass it off as new.  Id. at 281–82.  The Court upheld the 
conviction on the grounds that, even though the criminal conduct took place outside the state, 
Michigan jurisdiction was obtained because the conduct was intended to produce and did produce 
harmful effects within the state.  Id. at 284–85.  Nielsen v. Oregon rejected a state’s efforts to 
assert extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction, but it did so on peculiar facts involving Oregon’s 
prosecution of a Washington resident for using a particular kind of fishing net, for which the 
defendant had a Washington license, on the Washington side of the Columbia River.  212 U.S. 
315, 321 (1909).  The precedential value of Nielsen may thus be limited because in it the 
regulating state had neither territoriality nor domicile as a basis for jurisdiction.  See also 
Bradford, supra note 67, at 129 (asserting that “[t]he greatest problem with Nielsen is that it 
reflects a discredited constitutional philosophy of choice of law” because it was decided in an era 
in which “the Supreme Court applied strict territorial limits even to civil choice of law”). 
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impermissible extensions.  Nor can the Supreme Court decisions upholding 
extraterritorial application of state criminal laws be dismissed as merely 
aberrational.  It is well settled that the United States, which is subject to due 
process limitations similar to those applicable to states, can regulate the 
conduct of U.S. citizens even when it occurs abroad.82  In apparent reliance on 
this analogy, the Restatement of the Conflicts of Laws echoes the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Skiriotes v. Florida83 in asserting that “[a]n individual State 
of the United States also has jurisdiction to apply its local law in certain 
instances to its absent citizens.”84  In addition, there are state court cases, some 
running back to the nineteenth century,85 that have applied state criminal laws 
to out-of-state events.  In the modern day, too, courts have upheld the 
enforcement of state criminal statutes to punish such out-of-state conduct as 
non-payment of child support and detention of a child by a non-custodial 
parent.86  Indeed, one writer goes so far as to maintain that Bigelow is the “only 
decision calling into question the extraterritorial authority of states over 
citizens.”87 
 
 82. “[T]he United States may apply its criminal law to acts done by its nationals in other 
countries (United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922); cf. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 
421 (1932)) and may tax its absent nationals upon property situated abroad (United States v. 
Bennett, 232 U.S. 299 (1914)) and upon income derived therefrom.  Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 
(1924).”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 9 cmt. f (1971). 
 83. 313 U.S. at 77. 
 84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 9 cmt. f (1971).  In Sun Oil Co. v. 
Wortman, the Supreme Court suggested that the Full Faith and Credit Clause should “be 
interpreted against the background of principles developed in international conflicts law.”  486 
U.S. 717, 723 (1988). 
 85. See Hanks v. State, 13 Tex. Ct. App. 289 (Ct. App. 1882) (upholding Texas authority to 
punish the forging in Louisiana of a certificate of title to Texas land); Commonwealth v. Gaines, 
4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 172 (1819) (upholding the application of Virginia criminal law against a 
Virginia citizen who stole a horse in the District of Columbia). 
 86. See Bradford, supra note 67, at 100–04 (collecting cases).  Several courts faced with this 
dilemma have overcome presumptions against extraterritorial jurisdiction on the grounds that 
failures to pay child support or to return children to the proper custodian are criminal omissions 
that occur constructively within the home state.  See, e.g., State v. Doyle, 828 P.2d 1316 (Idaho 
1992); State v. Doyen, 676 A.2d 345 (Vt. 1996).  Other courts have concluded that the out-of-
state activity produces an in-state harm.  See, e.g., State v. Kane, 625 A.2d 1361 (R.I. 1993); Rios 
v. State, 733 P.2d 242 (Wyo. 1987).  Such cases show a willingness to extend extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in substance, if not in form. 
  The Model Penal Code states that a state can impose criminal liability based on acts 
occurring in other states as long as the applicable statute “expressly prohibits conduct outside the 
State” and the regulated conduct “bears a reasonable relation to a legitimate interest of th[at] 
State.”  MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03(1)(f) (1962). 
 87. Mark P. Gergen, Equality and the Conflict of Laws, 73 IOWA L. REV. 893, 907 n.94 
(1988); see also Rosen, supra note 75, at 896 (“Home States indeed have a presumptive power to 
regulate their citizens’ out-of-state activities to avoid travel-evasion. . . . Such powers are 
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When authorities upholding the assertion of state power to impose criminal 
penalties on conduct occurring out of state are matched against the clear, on-
point assertion in Bigelow v. Virginia that one state “possesse[s] no authority to 
regulate the services provided in [another state],”88 I would not pretend to 
pronounce a confident judgment on whether, following the overruling of Roe v. 
Wade, the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses would permit a pro-
life state to make it a crime for its citizens to procure abortions in other states.  
But I have no hesitation in concluding that this question would be a difficult 
one that is not clearly resolved in the negative by the Supreme Court’s past 
decisions. 
This is itself a relatively strong conclusion, adequate to refute the claim 
that the overruling of Roe v. Wade would necessarily remove difficult abortion 
questions from the Supreme Court’s docket.  But a further, perhaps more 
surprising speculation may also be worth venturing.  In assessing whether a 
state could regulate its citizens’ efforts to procure out-of-state abortions, the 
Court might possibly hold categorically that states can always deploy their 
criminal law to regulate their citizens’ out-of-state conduct.  Or the Court 
might hold that the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses always bar 
state criminal prosecutions based on out-of-state occurrences.  Or, what seems 
to me most likely, the Court might hold that a state can regulate its citizens’ 
out-of-state conduct only insofar as that conduct has some further impact on 
the state’s interests or policies that reverberate within the regulating state.  If 
so, the Court would need to determine whether the states have a sufficient 
interest in the lives of fetuses conceived by their citizens within their borders to 
justify the exercise of extraterritorial regulatory jurisdiction.89  Framed within 
the conceptual apparatus of conflicts of laws, the question would be whether a 
regulating state had “a significant contact or significant aggregation of 
contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law [would be] neither 
arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”90 
2. An Aside on Conflicts of Laws and the Implications of State 
Citizenship 
If I am right in my analysis so far, the overruling of Roe v. Wade would not 
only invite disputes about the permissible extraterritorial application of state 
anti-abortion laws, but also bring to the fore a largely unappreciated ambiguity 
in the constitutional claim that responsibility for abortion regulation should be 
 
consonant with longstanding Supreme Court caselaw, and they have not been undermined by the 
case of Bigelow v. Virginia or any Supreme Court decision since.”). 
 88. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 824 (1975). 
 89. See Kreimer, supra note 66, at 478–79; Bradford, supra note 67, at 114–18. 
 90. Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. 
Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981)). 
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returned to the states.  As the case of extraterritorial legislation highlights, the 
relevant question is: Which states should get to make the decision for whom? 
So far, I have suggested that if this question needs to be resolved pursuant 
to a contacts- or interest-based analysis, then it would be too simple to assume 
categorically that each state necessarily gets to frame the abortion rules 
applicable to all abortions occurring within its territory.  It is at least possible 
that Utah might have sufficient contacts to justify its prohibiting a Utah citizen 
from getting an abortion in California, even if abortion would otherwise be 
lawful in California. 
Suppose for the moment that this is true (even though I do not mean to be 
claiming ultimately that it necessarily is true).  On this supposition, a further 
question arises about whether the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit 
Clauses would also permit Utah to make it a crime for a California doctor 
practicing in California to abort the fetus of a Utah citizen who had traveled to 
California just to procure an abortion there. 
I do not know the answer to this question.  On the one hand, it might be 
asserted that Utah had no contacts with a California doctor that would justify it 
in applying its criminal law to an abortion performed by that doctor in 
California.91  Issues of fair notice might also arise if a California doctor had no 
reasonable way of knowing whether a patient resided within an anti-abortion 
state or whether her fetus was conceived there.  On the other hand, if Utah 
could make it a crime for a Utah citizen to undergo an abortion in California, it 
is not obvious that Utah should be able to apply its law to one party to the 
transaction but not to the other, especially insofar as it could be said that the 
California doctor was an accomplice to a crime the adverse effects of which—
involving the death of a fetus—were felt in Utah.  The dispositive question, 
once again, might involve whether the state’s interest in the life of a fetus gave 
it a sufficient “contact” to make the exercise of its regulatory jurisdiction 
neither “arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”92 
As before, however, it is not crucial for my current purposes to attempt to 
resolve the scope of the power that pro-life states might have to criminalize 
out-of-state abortions if Roe v. Wade should be overruled.  My point is more 
analytical than normative or predictive: If the Supreme Court were to overrule 
Roe v. Wade, it would almost certainly need to confront hard issues about the 
meaning of both state citizenship and national citizenship.  With respect to 
state citizenship, competing claims would be at stake.  From one direction, 
 
 91. Cf. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 404, 407–08 (1930) (finding that Texas could 
not apply its law to an action against an out-of-state defendant based on events all of which had 
occurred in New York or Mexico, even though the plaintiff was and had been a Texas 
domiciliary).  But cf. O’Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194, 202–06 (2d Cir. 1978) 
(applying New York choice-of-law rules and New York substantive law in a wrongful death 
action against a Virginia corporation based on the death of a New York domiciliary in Virginia). 
 92. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 818 (quoting Hague, 449 U.S. at 313). 
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some states would likely claim authority to regulate their citizens’ conduct—
and, in particular, the procurement of abortions—outside their borders.93  From 
another direction, other states might assert an entitlement to immunize their 
citizens from prosecution under the laws of another state for conduct occurring 
within the borders of the citizens’ own state.94  For example, California might 
claim authority to immunize California doctors from prosecution under the 
laws of Utah for performing abortions within the state of California, even if the 
abortions involved Utah women who had conceived their fetuses in Utah.  But 
the contest of claims of authority would not merely pit state against state.  
Hovering in the background, of course, would be a further deep question about 
whether there are rights of national citizenship, embodied perhaps in the Due 
Process Clause, to be able to avoid the reach of a particular state’s regulatory 
policies, of which one might conscientiously disapprove, by absenting oneself 
from that state’s territorial jurisdiction.95 
In framing these questions, I am less interested in attempting to squeeze 
the competing interests into a contacts-based framework than in identifying 
what the Supreme Court in a practical sense would need to decide.  In 
substance and effect, the Court would need to weigh one state’s interests in 
protecting fetal life against another state’s interests in making abortion within 
its territory a matter of individual conscience, and it would need to do so while, 
at the same time, taking account of the implications of national citizenship.  So 
much for the idea that the overruling of Roe v. Wade would remove hard 
decisions about abortion regulation from the judicial province. 
3. Further Potential Barriers to State Regulation 
In suggesting that states’ efforts to regulate abortions outside their 
territories would require the Supreme Court to assess the significance of state 
interests in regulating out-of-state abortions, I am in one sense getting ahead of 
myself.  Even if state legislation barring out-of-state abortions would not run 
afoul of the Due Process or Full Faith and Credit Clauses, other constitutional 
 
 93. For a defense of the view that states should have the option of attaching far-reaching 
consequences to state citizenship, see Rosen, supra note 75.  For a response, see Seth F. Kreimer, 
Lines in the Sand: The Importance of Borders in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 973 
(2002). 
 94. Professor Brilmayer argues that the implicit policy of pro-choice states in a post-Roe 
world would be to immunize individual choices relating to abortion and that, in this case of 
conflict between the laws of pro-choice states and states attempting to regulate abortion 
extraterritorially, “[t]erritoriality trumps residence.”  Brilmayer, supra note 67, at 892.  For a 
skeptical rejoinder, see Neuman, supra note 67, at 949–50 & n.44 (emphasizing that state 
conferrals of “sovereign immunity” from suit are not binding in the courts of other states under 
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979)). 
 95. See Kreimer, “But Whoever Treasures Freedom . . .”, supra note 67, at 914–21 (so 
arguing). 
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provisions might apply.  Critics of anti-abortion legislation have already cited a 
number of constitutional norms or doctrines under which objections could be 
raised to states’ attempts to prevent their citizens from procuring out-of-state 
abortions.  Although I want to say a few words about a number of such 
objections, I shall not pretend to resolve them all.  Once again, my principal 
point will be that state efforts to regulate abortion in the aftermath of an 
overruling of Roe v. Wade would potentially raise a variety of constitutional 
issues, some of them difficult and contentious. 
a. Privileges and Immunities Clause 
Professor Seth Kreimer96 has argued that a state law prohibiting its citizens 
from procuring abortions in states where abortion was otherwise lawful would 
violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, which provides that 
“[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities 
of Citizens in the several States.”97  This is a plausible argument.  Read 
literally, the Privileges and Immunities Clause appears to establish that a 
citizen of Utah, traveling in California, should be entitled to the privileges and 
immunities enjoyed by California citizens in the state of California, including 
any privileges and immunities involving abortion.98 
On another interpretation, however, the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
is a non-discrimination provision the sole effect of which is to prohibit host 
states from imposing hostile regulations on out-of-state visitors.  Read this 
way, the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not limit the obligations that a 
state can impose on its own citizens when they travel out of state.99  If Roe v. 
Wade were overruled, efforts by pro-life states to prohibit their citizens from 
procuring out-of-state abortions could thus force the Supreme Court to choose 
between dueling interpretations of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 
b. Sixth Amendment 
Some commentators have maintained that a state’s attempt to prohibit out-
of-state abortions would run afoul of the “vicinage requirement” of the Sixth 
Amendment, which specifies that the trial of crimes must occur in the state in 
 
 96. Id. at 917. 
 97. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
 98. See Kreimer, “But Whosoever Treasures Freedom . . .”, supra note 67, at 917. 
 99. See Rosen, supra note 75, at 900–03.  Professor Rosen cites to language in a number of 
early cases suggesting that the Clause applies only to host-state regulations of visitors.  Id.  
Among modern cases, he relies on United Building and Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of 
Camden in which the Court held that unlike citizens of other states, New Jersey residents could 
not maintain a Privileges and Immunities Clause challenge to a New Jersey law because “New 
Jersey residents at least have a chance to remedy at the polls any discrimination against them.”  
Id. (quoting United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor & Council of Camden, 465 U.S. 
208, 217 (1984)). 
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which the alleged crime occurred.100  Again, however, the argument to this 
effect is disputable.  A threshold question is whether the vicinage requirement 
even applies to state criminal prosecutions.  Although the Supreme Court has 
held that the Fourteenth Amendment makes nearly all provisions of the Bill of 
Rights applicable against the states, it has rejected the “total incorporation” 
theory and has insisted on a provision-by-provision assessment of whether 
particular guarantees are “fundamental to the American scheme of Justice.”101  
Applying this test, at least one state court has held that the vicinage 
requirement applies to the states.102  The weight of authority, however, lies 
against incorporation: the three Circuit Courts of Appeals that have considered 
the issue and several state courts have ruled that the vicinage requirement does 
not apply to state prosecutions.103  If those decisions hold up, there would be 
no Sixth Amendment obstacle to a state court’s enforcement of a state law 
prohibiting out-of-state abortions.  In order to determine whether a state could 
apply its criminal laws to abortions occurring outside its territory, the Supreme 
Court might therefore need to resolve the division about whether the Sixth 
Amendment vicinage requirement applies to state court criminal prosecutions. 
Even if the Supreme Court found that the vicinage requirement applied to 
state prosecutions, further issues would arise from readily imaginable state 
efforts to redefine the crime that they wished to prohibit so that it occurred 
within the state that sought to forbid abortions.104  For example, a state might 
make it unlawful for any women to engage in intrastate travel for purposes of 
obtaining an abortion, or it might forbid conspiracy to cause the destruction of 
a fetus, regardless of whether the actual destruction occurred in state or out of 
state.  Questions about the constitutionality of measures such as these—not all 
of which are clearly resolved under current doctrine—would then need to be 
confronted on their own terms. 
c. Commerce Clause 
Among the most serious challenges to the constitutionality of states’ 
efforts to stop their citizens from obtaining out-of-state abortions would 
involve the Dormant Commerce Clause.  Although the Commerce Clause is 
framed as an affirmative grant of power to Congress, the Supreme Court has 
 
 100. See Kreimer, supra note 66, at 484–85. 
 101. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). 
 102. See Miss. Publishers Corp. v. Coleman, 515 So. 2d 1163, 1165 (Miss. 1987). 
 103. See Caudill v. Scott, 857 F.2d 344, 345–46 (6th Cir. 1988); Cook v. Morrill, 783 F.2d 
593, 595 (5th Cir. 1986); Zicarelli v. Dietz, 633 F.2d 312, 325–26 (3rd Cir. 1980); Price v. 
Superior Court, 25 P.3d 618, 630, 632–33 (Cal. 2001); Sailor v. State, 733 So. 2d 1057, 1062 n.6 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Bowman, 588 A.2d 728, 730 (Me. 1991); Commonwealth v. 
Duteau, 424 N.E.2d 1119, 1125–26 (Mass. 1981); Garza v. State, 974 S.W.2d 251, 259 (Tex. 
App. 1998). 
 104. See Bradford, supra note 67, at 144–45. 
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long held that it also bars the states from enacting some types of regulatory 
legislation that interfere with the flow of commerce among the states.105  At the 
core of Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence lies a sharply two-tiered 
structure.  Under it, state regulations that purposely or facially discriminate 
against interstate commerce are virtually per se illegal.106  By contrast, 
nondiscriminatory statutes that incidentally restrict the flow of interstate 
commerce trigger a balancing test, most famously articulated in Pike v. Bruce 
Church, Inc.:107 
Where [a state statute] regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local 
public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it 
will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly 
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.  If a legitimate local purpose 
is found, then the question [whether the regulation should be invalidated] 
becomes one of degree.  And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated 
will . . . depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it 
could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.108 
Within this framework, a state’s law prohibiting its citizens from obtaining 
abortions would not discriminate against interstate commerce: it would ban 
abortions performed in-state as well as out-of-state.  Within the two-tiered 
analytical structure that normally applies, the question would therefore be 
whether the burden on interstate commerce was “excessive” when measured 
against the “local” interest in preventing abortions.  To make this 
determination, the Supreme Court, strikingly if not ironically, would need to 
assess the strength of a state’s interest in preserving fetal life within a 
balancing calculus, notwithstanding the frequent suggestion that the overruling 
of Roe v. Wade would spare the courts from needing to make such 
assessments. 
A complication arises, however, from a more minor, never fully explicated 
theme in Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine that condemns state efforts to 
engage in extraterritorial regulation.  In Healy v. Beer Institute, for example, 
the Supreme Court said flatly that the “Commerce Clause . . . precludes the 
application of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the 
State’s borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the State.”109  
If the Court means literally what it said in Healy, then state criminal laws 
forbidding their citizens from obtaining out-of-state abortions would obviously 
offend the Commerce Clause (even though it might still be possible for a state 
 
 105. E.g., Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 281–82 (1876). 
 106. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). 
 107. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
 108. Id. at 142 (citation omitted). 
 109. 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642–43 (1982)) 
(omission in original). 
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to avoid the Commerce Clause problem by framing its law to prevent in-state 
travel for purposes of procuring an abortion). 
It is not wholly clear, however, that the Healy dictum proscribing 
extraterritorial state legislation applies categorically to all cases or, more 
pointedly, that it would necessarily apply to state anti-abortion legislation.  In 
condemning extraterritorial regulation as impermissible under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court has typically spoken in contexts 
involving what it calls economic protectionism—efforts by one state to shield 
an in-state group or industry from out-of-state competition.110  Whatever other 
objections state anti-abortion legislation might invite, it would obviously not 
be “protectionist” in this distinctively economic sense.  Accordingly, it could 
be argued that state statutes that regulate out-of-state transactions by their 
citizens in order to promote non-economic goals (such as the preservation of 
fetal life) lie outside a prohibition that properly applies only to economically 
protectionist legislation. 
I do not know whether the Supreme Court would accept this argument.  
Once again, however, it seems plain that the overruling of Roe v. Wade could 
easily confront the Court with a difficult, currently unresolved issue about the 
constitutional permissibility of state anti-abortion legislation.  What is more, it 
is at least plausible to think that the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine that 
requires courts to weigh “local benefits” against national interests in the free 
flow of commerce would require the Court to make an explicit assessment of 
the strength of the states’ interest in preserving fetal life. 
d. Right to Travel 
It is surely arguable that state laws barring their citizens from procuring 
out-of-state abortions would violate the long recognized constitutional right of 
interstate travel.  In Bigelow v. Virginia, in which the Supreme Court stated 
that one state could not prohibit its citizens from procuring abortions in another 
state that made abortion lawful, Justice Blackmun’s opinion cited right-to-
travel cases.111  It also is arguable that a prohibition against out-of-state 
abortions would create a disincentive to travel and restrict the “experiment 
with modes of living other than those sanctioned at home” that the right to 
travel ought to protect.112 
It would probably be a mistake, however, to regard it as simply settled that 
a state’s prohibition against out-of-state abortions of fetuses conceived within 
 
 110. See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982) (“[W]e have long 
recognized a difference between economic protectionism, on the one hand, and health and safety 
regulation, on the other.”); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 531–32 (1949). 
 111. 421 U.S. 809, 824 (1975) (citing Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973); Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629–31 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757–59 (1966)). 
 112. Kreimer, “But Whoever Treasures Freedom . . .”, supra note 67, at 915. 
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the prohibiting state would always and necessarily violate the right to travel.  
Among other things, a number of cases have upheld state restrictions on travel 
by their citizens for purposes of avoiding obligations that the state is otherwise 
constitutionally permitted to impose.  For example, the Supreme Court has 
held that because a state can forbid a parent to abandon a dependent child, it 
can also make it a crime for a parent to travel outside the jurisdiction for the 
purpose of avoiding that obligation.113  By similar reasoning, it could be 
argued that whether a state infringes the right to travel by prohibiting its 
citizens from procuring out-of-state abortions would normally depend on 
whether the prohibition against out-of-state abortions is one that the state could 
otherwise validly impose—and, as I have been arguing at length now, the 
question of whether and when one state might otherwise be able to preclude its 
citizens from obtaining out-of-state abortions is very much open to debate. 
However this question might be resolved, there is at least one kind of case 
in which the right to travel would inescapably have a distinctive bearing.  The 
right to travel would be most clearly pertinent in cases in which a woman 
procuring an out-of-state abortion did not return to her prior state of residence 
but, in conjunction with the abortion, migrated to another state, perhaps not 
least because she wanted to become a citizen of a state with abortion laws that 
she found enlightened or congenial.  Even in this case, it might be argued that 
the state in which a fetus was conceived, by one of its citizens, has a sufficient 
attachment to the fetus to warrant state regulation to protect it.  For example, it 
might be maintained that if a state can lawfully impose an obligation on 
pregnant women not to destroy their fetuses, it can bar their efforts to avoid 
this obligation by taking up residence in another state.114  To resolve the 
competing claims in a case such as this would require deep immersion in cases 
involving conflicts of laws and, inevitably, an ultimate judgment suffused by 
contestable normative assessments. 
Without offering a judgment of my own, I would simply note, indeed 
emphasize, that in a case in which a woman wanted to change her residence in 
order to escape one state’s anti-abortion legislation that political majorities in 
other states would reject as tyrannical and unjust, there is a palpable tension 
between the competing claims of state and national citizenship under the 
Constitution of the United States.  Can one state’s interest in protecting fetal 
life outweigh a woman’s asserted right, rooted in her national citizenship, to 
migrate to another state and to enjoy the privileges or immunities of citizenship 
 
 113. Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 420 (1981). 
 114. See generally Joseph William Singer, Same Sex Marriage, Full Faith and Credit, and 
the Evasion of Obligation, 1 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 1 (2005) (exploring 
comparable issues arising from state efforts to enforce obligations arising from gay marriage). 
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of that other state?115  This hard and important question starkly spotlights one 
of the principal points that I have meant to emphasize so far: the overruling of 
Roe v. Wade could not simply transfer responsibility for abortion regulation to 
the states and thereby absolve the courts of responsibility for constitutional 
oversight, for the power of the states to regulate abortion necessarily implicates 
rights of national citizenship.  By overruling Roe, the Supreme Court could and 
would eliminate one set of national rights that women confronted with anti-
abortion regulations now can claim under the Due Process Clause.  
Inescapably, however, hard questions about the constitutionality of state anti-
abortion legislation would continue to present themselves under other 
provisions of the Constitution. 
C. Abortion, Free Speech, and National Citizenship 
A state that was strongly committed to preserving fetal life might not rest 
content with forbidding abortion within its territorial jurisdiction and with 
banning (or at least attempting to ban) its citizens from procuring out-of-state 
abortions.  Such a state might also prohibit activities likely to encourage 
women to seek abortions, such as the advertising of or provision of information 
concerning out-of-state abortion services.  Virginia, for example, had taken this 
step in the statute that provoked the Supreme Court’s decision in Bigelow v. 
Virginia.116  In states in which abortion is legal, abortion advertising and 
counseling enjoy First Amendment protection.  But for commercial advertising 
to be protected under the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has said 
repeatedly that it must “concern lawful activity.”117  The question thus arises 
whether the overruling of Roe v. Wade would inaugurate a regime in which 
First Amendment rights to engage in abortion-related speech would vary from 
state to state, depending on whether particular states permitted or prohibited 
abortion. 
 
 115. Even if it were assumed that a woman who left a pro-life state to become a domiciliary 
of a pro-choice state thereby escaped the reach of the pro-life state’s criminal laws, a question 
would potentially remain whether her purported change of residence was genuine and valid, if the 
woman thereafter returned to the state whose regulations she had fled.  For discussion of relevant 
precedents, see Bradford, supra note 67, at 132–35.  Professor Bradford concludes that “an 
extraterritorial abortion would be risky for the pregnant woman unless she truly intended to 
change residence and not return to her original domicile.” Id. at 135. 
 116. 421 U.S. at 811. 
 117. E.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); 
see also Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 389 
(1973) (“Any First Amendment interest which might be served by advertising an ordinary 
commercial proposal and which might arguably outweigh the governmental interest supporting 
the regulation is altogether absent when the commercial activity itself is illegal and the restriction 
on advertising is incidental to a valid limitation on economic activity.”). 
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1. Prohibitions Against Abortion Advertising 
If Roe v. Wade were overruled, there is no doubt that any state forbidding 
abortion within its borders could also prohibit the advertising of abortions to be 
performed within its territorial jurisdiction, even though similar advertising 
would remain constitutionally protected in pro-choice states.118  A more 
challenging question would arise if an anti-abortion state attempted to extend 
its prohibition of abortion advertising to encompass advertisement of abortion 
services provided in other states that had not outlawed abortions.  In thinking 
about the constitutionality of such a prohibition under the First Amendment, 
myriad distinctions might be relevant, but for the sake of simplicity I shall 
organize my discussion around two divergent hypotheses.  I shall imagine, 
first, that the state that wishes to ban the advertising of out-of-state abortions 
either has not barred its citizens from traveling out of state to procure abortions 
or that it would be constitutionally impermissible for a state to impose this 
form of extraterritorial regulation.  I shall then assume, alternatively, that a 
state barring the advertisement of out-of-state abortions has also made it 
unlawful for its citizens to procure out-of-state abortions and that the 
Constitution permits it to do so. 
a. Advertisements of Lawful Out-of-State Abortions 
If we assume first that an anti-abortion state attempts to prohibit the 
advertising within its borders of abortions that are lawful in other states, the 
precedents most pertinent to the prohibition’s constitutionality would seem to 
point in opposite directions.  In Bigelow v. Virginia, the Supreme Court 
invalidated a Virginia prohibition against the advertising within Virginia of 
abortions that were lawful in New York.119  The Court’s decision emphasized 
three points.  First, 
the advertisement conveyed information of potential interest and value to a 
diverse audience—not only to readers possibly in need of the services offered, 
but also to those with a general curiosity about, or genuine interest in, the 
subject matter or the law of another State and its development, and to readers 
seeking reform in Virginia.120 
 
 118. Disparity of this kind would not be wholly unprecedented.  In United States v. Edge 
Broadcasting Co., the Supreme Court upheld a federal statute prohibiting the broadcast of lottery 
advertising by any broadcaster located in a state that banned lotteries.  509 U.S. 418 (1993).  
Similarly, First Amendment rights vary from state to state under the Supreme Court test that 
makes the definition of constitutionally unprotected “obscenity” depend on what is “patently 
offensive” under state or local, rather than national, “contemporary community standards.”  See, 
e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).  Nevertheless, the overruling of Roe would pave 
the way for significant new variations. 
 119. Bigelow, 421 U.S. 809. 
 120. Id. at 822. 
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Second, “the activity advertised pertained to constitutional interests” 
recognized in Roe v. Wade, which had come down in the course of Bigelow’s 
appeal.121  Third, the Court emphasized that abortion services were legal in 
New York and said expressly that a state “may not, under the guise of 
exercising internal police powers, bar a citizen of another State from 
disseminating information about an activity that is legal in that State.”122 
In United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.,123 however, the Court upheld a 
federal statute that barred media outlets located in states that banned lotteries 
from advertising out-of-state lotteries that were legal in the states in which they 
occurred.  The Court reached its conclusion in Edge Broadcasting by applying 
the four-part test that it had developed in Central Hudson Gas & Electric 
Corp. v. Public Service Commission124 to gauge the permissibility of 
regulations of commercial advertising.  Under that test, the Court determined 
that the federal government had a “substantial” interest in supporting the 
policies of the non-lottery states, which had permissibly prohibited a long-
suspect practice that “implicate[d] no constitutionally protected right.”125  
Having done so, the Court also concluded that the challenged federal statute 
directly advanced the government’s interest and that it was not more extensive 
than necessary to serve that interest.126  Perhaps significantly, the Court did not 
cite to or attempt to distinguish Bigelow, even though Justice Stevens, writing 
in dissent, relied heavily on that earlier case in arguing that the Court had 
already decided that advertisements for conduct that is legal in another state 
should receive First Amendment protection.127 
Although it would be arguable that after Edge Broadcasting, Bigelow no 
longer controls any case in which the advertised activity has been forbidden by 
the state that also wants to bar the advertisement and does not “implicate[] [a] 
constitutionally protected right”128 (as abortion advertising would not if Roe v. 
Wade were overruled), there is also an argument to be made on the other side.  
In more recent cases, the Supreme Court has expressed deep skepticism about 
the constitutional permissibility of regulating truthful advertising that does no 
more than provide information about the availability of a lawful product or 
 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 824–25. 
 123. 509 U.S. 418 (1993). 
 124. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (“For commercial speech to come within [the First 
Amendment], [1] it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.  Next, we ask [2] 
whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial.  If both inquiries yield positive answers, 
we must determine [3] whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest 
asserted, and [4] whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”). 
 125. Edge Broad., 509 U.S. at 426. 
 126. Id. at 427–30. 
 127. Id. at 439 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 128. Id. at 426. 
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service (such as I am now assuming that abortion would be in the jurisdictions 
in which it would be performed).129  Significantly, however, the recent cases 
that have struck down bans on advertisements that merely convey truthful 
information have never confronted the permissibility of a state’s efforts to 
restrict the advertising within its borders of a product or activity that that state 
has outlawed within its territorial jurisdiction.130 
The question that would be presented by an anti-abortion state’s attempt to 
ban the advertising of abortions that would be lawful in other states would thus 
seem to be a contestable one.  In resolving such a case, the Supreme Court 
would necessarily and explicitly have to assess the weight of an anti-abortion 
state’s interest in barring abortion advertising, at least to determine whether 
this interest rose to the level of being “substantial” under the Central Hudson 
test.131  If so, the Court would then need to determine whether the prohibition 
directly advanced the state’s interest and was no broader than necessary.  In 
making determinations such as these, the Court could hardly fail to take note of 
the weight and nature of the interests supporting and opposing a ban on 
abortion advertising. 
b. Advertising of Abortions That Would Be Unlawful in Some But Not 
All Cases 
If we assume now that an anti-abortion state, say Utah, has constitutionally 
permissibly made it a crime for its citizens to procure out-of-state as well as in-
state abortions, the First Amendment analysis develops new complexities, as 
becomes readily apparent if we imagine the issues that would arise from the 
advertising of an abortion provider located in a pro-choice state that reached 
Utah through some nationally available medium such as a magazine or internet 
website.  On the one hand, an advertisement offering abortion services to 
citizens of Utah (among others) would propose a commercial transaction that 
would be unlawful for any currently pregnant Utah resident to enter.  On the 
 
 129. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 564 (2001) (emphasizing “that 
tobacco retailers and manufacturers have an interest in conveying truthful information about their 
products to adults, and adults have a corresponding interest in receiving information about 
tobacco products”); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (invalidating a ban 
on advertising that conveyed truthful information concerning liquor prices). 
 130. In Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association, Inc. v. United States, the Supreme 
Court invalidated a federal statute barring all broadcast advertisements of casino gambling, 
including advertisements of such gambling by broadcasters located in states in which casino 
gambling was legal.  527 U.S. 173 (1999).  In doing so, however, the Court did not question the 
continuing validity of Edge Broadcasting.  Instead, its decision rested mostly on the rationale that 
the challenged statute was “so pierced by exemptions and inconsistencies that the Government 
cannot hope to exonerate it.”  Id. at 190.  “Had the Federal Government adopted a more coherent 
policy, or accommodated the rights of speakers in States that have legalized the underlying 
conduct, this might be a different case,” the Court said.  Id. at 195 (citation omitted). 
 131. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
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other hand, if the services would be performed in another state, say California, 
it would not necessarily be unlawful for an abortion provider in California, 
which permits abortions, to enter into the same transaction with a woman who 
was not a Utah citizen if the agreement were reached and the abortion were 
performed in California.  At the threshold of analysis under the now-prevailing 
test for the regulation of commercial speech, a court would therefore have to 
confront the question—so far unprecedented in the Supreme Court—whether 
in these circumstances the advertisement “concern[ed] lawful activity,”132 and 
thus triggered First Amendment protection under the Central Hudson test, or 
whether it proposed at least some unlawful transactions and was therefore 
categorically prohibitable.  In resolving this question, a court would need to 
consider that if it were to accept the second characterization, the practical 
effect would be to allow the states with the most restrictive anti-abortion 
legislation to limit what could lawfully be advertised in any newspaper or 
magazine of national circulation or in any other medium of nationwide reach. 
This result might seem draconian from a First Amendment perspective 
even if the Supreme Court were prepared to allow the states very great 
flexibility to impose substantive restrictions on their citizens’ access to 
abortion even after their citizens had traveled out of state.  To be sure, the 
Court has permitted what is obscene and therefore prohibitable to be defined 
partly by reference to local “community standards.”133  The upshot is that the 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. In Hamling v. United States, the Court rejected a challenge to a federal statute that 
proscribed the mailing of obscene materials and left obscenity to be defined locally as permitted 
under Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).  Hamling,  418 U.S. 87 (1974).  In Sable 
Communications of California, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, the Court similarly 
rejected a challenge to a federal statute that subjected a “dial-a-porn” operator to local obscenity 
standards.  492 U.S. 115, 117–18, 131 (1989).  The Court rejected Sable’s argument that the 
statute effectively subjected it to the obscenity standards of the least tolerant community in the 
nation.  Id. at 124.  The Court seemed to assume that Sable could have excluded callers from 
certain states had it wanted to and that it ought to bear the burden and cost of excluding them.  
See id. at 125.  More recently, however, the Court has appeared to struggle with the question 
whether a federal regulatory statute could incorporate the varied state definitions of obscenity in 
regulating speech on the Internet.  In Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union (Ashcroft I), the 
Court rejected a facial challenge to the Child Online Protection Act (COPA), which subjected 
website producers to criminal penalties for allowing children to have access to materials that 
would be considered obscene according to the standards of their local community, on the ground 
that the respondents had not met their burden of showing that COPA was substantially overbroad.  
535 U.S. 564 (2002).  In doing so, however, the Justices divided over whether speech made 
available over the Internet could be judged by the standards of particular local communities.  
Writing for a plurality of four Justices, Justice Thomas wrote that “[i]f a publisher wishes for its 
material to be judged only by the standards of particular communities, then it need only take the 
simple step of utilizing a medium that enables it to target the release of its material into those 
communities.”  Id. at 583.  But Justice O’Connor wrote separately to note, inter alia, that the 
reasoning of Hamling and Sable would be too burdensome as applied to the Internet and to argue 
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state with the broadest prohibition against obscenity may shape what any 
nationwide distributor of sexually explicit materials will dare to disseminate 
anywhere.  More directly on point, the state with the broadest prohibition 
against obscenity can determine what a nationally distributed advertisement of 
sexually explicit materials can lawfully offer as available for direct delivery.  
But obscenity is different from commercial advertising.  The Court has 
adjudged that any material that is obscene under the standards of any state has 
so little value that practical disincentives to its dissemination are not matters of 
significant constitutional concern.  By contrast, recent Supreme Court 
decisions suggest that the national and constitutional interest in ensuring the 
free flow of truthful information about goods and services that are lawfully 
available in other jurisdictions is a good deal stronger.134 
The cases that emphasize the value of commercial advertisements are, of 
course, all distinguishable.  The products and services involved in them could 
all be provided lawfully—as measured by all potentially applicable laws—to 
all of those to whom they were offered.  Accordingly, it might be said, to come 
within the reach of past decisions protecting commercial speech, an abortion 
advertiser would need to restrict what it advertised.  It could offer to perform 
abortions only for women who could lawfully abort their fetuses under all of 
the laws applicable to them, including the laws of their states of residence.  But 
would it be constitutionally tolerable for anti-abortion states to insist that any 
abortion provider who wanted to engage in national advertising must limit its 
offer of abortion services to citizens of states that permit their residents to have 
abortions?  This question might occasion no difficulty if it were assumed that 
one state, such as Utah, could validly make it a crime for a California doctor to 
perform an abortion on a Utah citizen even within the state of California.  But 
suppose, slightly more weakly, that Utah could make it a crime for a Utah 
woman to procure an abortion in California, but not for a California doctor to 
perform an abortion there, even on a Utah resident.  Under these 
circumstances, would the First Amendment permit Utah effectively to restrict 
nationwide advertising by California abortion providers?  If Roe v. Wade were 
overruled, the Supreme Court might need to confront this question about the 
 
that the Court should adopt a national obscenity standard for the Internet.  Id. at 587 (O’Connor, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  Justice Breyer took a similar position in 
his concurrence, as did Justice Kennedy, who wrote for the remaining Justices.  Id. at 590–91 
(Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 594–95 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment).  In Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union (Ashcroft II), the 
Court held the COPA unconstitutional on the ground that it was not narrowly tailored to a 
compelling governmental interest (because it failed to consider the possibility of using filters to 
shield children from obscene images rather than restrictions on the websites themselves), but it 
did not revisit the question whether speech posted on the Internet could be adjudged obscene 
pursuant to local community standards.  542 U.S. 656, 666–70 (2004). 
 134. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 564; 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. 484. 
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respective claims of state regulatory authority and the free speech rights 
entailed by national citizenship. 
2. Prohibitions Against Abortion Counseling 
Similarly complex and largely uncharted First Amendment issues would 
arise if, following the overruling of Roe v. Wade, a state that banned in-state 
abortions and also forbade its citizens to seek out-of-state abortions should ban 
the provision of abortion counseling or the dissemination of information with 
the aim of inciting or abetting the procurement of (illegal) abortions to be 
performed out of state.  In Brandenburg v. Ohio135 the Supreme Court 
established stringent protections for politically motivated speech aimed at 
inciting illegal conduct, including a proviso that incitements could not be 
prohibited unless likely to produce “imminent” illegal action.136  It is less than 
wholly clear, however, whether and, if so, how Brandenburg limits the 
capacity of states to punish speech that aids and abets, rather than incites, the 
commission of a crime by instructing pregnant women on how to obtain illegal 
abortions. 
If an anti-abortion state sought to prohibit the dissemination of information 
about the availability of out-of-state abortion services on the ground that such 
information would predictably abet the procurement of abortions prohibited by 
that state’s laws, its regulation would force the Supreme Court to determine the 
constitutional protection, if any, that should be afforded to what Eugene 
Volokh has characterized as “crime-facilitating speech.”137  According to 
Volokh, the Court has yet to confront the First Amendment issues posed by 
speech that provides information that predictably assists criminal activity but 
also has the potential to advance beneficial purposes such as contributing to 
public debate.138  At the very least, state efforts to stifle speech that would aid 
and abet the procurement of illegal out-of-state abortions would thus give rise 
to unresolved constitutional questions.139 
 
 135. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 136. Id. at 447. 
 137. Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095 (2005).  For other 
valuable commentary, see KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 
(1989). 
 138. Volokh, supra note 137, at 1128 (“No Supreme Court case squarely deals with crime-
facilitating speech.”).  Professor Volokh supports this contention by referring to an opinion by 
Justice Stevens who wrote in a statement relating to the denial of certiorari that “Our cases have 
not yet considered whether, and if so to what extent, the First Amendment protects such 
instructional speech.”  Id. at 1128 (quoting Stewart v. McCoy, 537 U.S. 993, 995 (2002) 
(Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari)). 
 139. If anti-abortion states could otherwise ban the advertising of out-of-state abortions or the 
abetting of efforts to procure out-of-state abortions within their borders, a further set of issues 
would arise involving the constitutionality of their efforts to assert personal jurisdiction over out-
of-state entities whose only contacts with the regulating state came through internet websites.  In 
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D. “Culture Wars” and the Meaning of State and National Citizenship 
Critics of Supreme Court decisions involving socially divisive issues that 
are not clearly resolved by the original understanding of pertinent 
constitutional language have sometimes argued that the Court should avoid 
participation in an ongoing “culture war” between competing conservative and 
liberal moralities.140  If a culture war exists, then judicial neutrality possesses 
at least a surface allure.  It seems doubtful, however, that neutrality is a live 
option. 
Imagine a jurisprudential world following the reversal of Roe v. Wade in 
which, without violating the Constitution as construed by the Supreme Court, 
some states not only prohibit abortion within their own territory, but also make 
it unlawful for their citizens to undergo out-of-state abortions.  In addition, 
these same anti-abortion states prohibit abortion advertising and abortion 
counseling.  For the citizens of these states, abortion is illegal, even when they 
have journeyed elsewhere, and some talk about the desirability and availability 
of abortions is illegal too when they are in their state of residence. 
Other states, by contrast, have no prohibitions against abortion.  Within 
these states, abortion advertising and counseling enjoy First Amendment 
protection.  For citizens of these states, abortion is legally available both within 
the jurisdiction and also within any other state that permits it. 
In a world such as this, the stakes of the culture war—if this is an apt term 
of description—would be exceedingly high.  Rights would vary dramatically 
from state to state in some cases and with state citizenship in others.  More 
significance would attach to state citizenship than attaches now.141  At the 
extreme, a woman’s right to procure a lawful abortion, anywhere, could 
depend on the state of which she happened to be a citizen, and her right to 
obtain certain kinds of abortion-related information could depend on the state 
 
the leading case involving the print media, Calder v. Jones, the Supreme Court held that 
employees of a Florida-based magazine were amenable to suit in California based on the 
foreseeable effects of an article damaging the plaintiff’s reputation in California, even though 
they personally had had no other contacts with California.  465 U.S. 783 (1984).  No case 
involving a state’s personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state website operator has yet reached the 
Supreme Court, and the lower court decisions have not reached a consensus on a controlling test 
or principles.  For useful discussions, see Arthur R. Miller, The Emerging Law of the Internet, 38 
GA. L. REV. 991, 995–96 (2004); Wendy Perdue, Aliens, the Internet, and “Purposeful 
Availment”: A Reassessment of Fifth Amendment Limits on Personal Jurisdiction, 98 NW. U. L. 
REV. 455 (2004); Martin H. Redish, Of New Wine and Old Bottles: Personal Jurisdiction, The 
Internet, and the Nature of Constitutional Evolution, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 575 (1998); Mary 
Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business with Doing-Business Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 171 (2001). 
 140. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 141. For a normative defense of the view that states should be able to regulate out-of-state 
conduct by their citizens and one which champions a constitutional regime that permits the states 
to attach large consequences to state citizenship, see Rosen, supra note 75. 
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in which she happened to be located.  Correspondingly, the scope of freedom 
that currently attends national citizenship would diminish. 
It is unthinkable that the Supreme Court could allow a transition from the 
jurisprudential regime that we now inhabit to the one that I have just imagined 
without repeated, difficult assessments of state anti-abortion legislation of 
various kinds.  The notion that by overruling Roe the Supreme Court could 
extract itself from controversial assessments of the constitutionality of state 
anti-abortion legislation is not just a fallacy.  It is a delusion. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND FUNDAMENTAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
It has sometimes been asserted that a Supreme Court decision overruling 
Roe v. Wade would, or at least could, be so written that the rest of 
constitutional jurisprudence involving fundamental rights would survive 
unaltered.142  Although claims involving what an overruling decision would do 
and what it could do require separate analysis, confident assertions about 
limited impact should not be accepted at face value in either case. 
If the Supreme Court decided to overrule Roe, there are many ways in 
which it might do so, each with different immediate implications.  As I noted 
above, it is imaginable, but highly unlikely, that the Court would reject Roe on 
the ground that fetuses are persons in the constitutional sense with the same 
rights to life as any other persons in the United States.143  Or the Court could 
overrule Roe on the ground that the only rights substantively protected under 
the Due Process Clause are those deeply rooted in tradition, thereby calling 
directly into question the decision in Lawrence v. Texas144 protecting private 
acts of homosexual intimacy.  Or the Court might conclude that the states have 
“compelling” interests in protecting fetal life from the moment of conception.  
A decision so reasoned might have significant implications for any or all of the 
issues that I have discussed already that depend at least partly on the nature 
and significance of a state’s interests in being able to prohibit abortions, 
including possibly abortions occurring out of state.  Or, perhaps most 
modestly, the Court might hold simply, at least in the first instance, that 
whatever other rights of sexual and procreative autonomy might exist under the 
Due Process Clause and might receive more stringent judicial protection, 
abortion is different because it inherently entails the destruction of a fetus.  A 
ruling to this effect would establish only that state measures limiting abortion 
do not offend the Due Process Clause as long as they are rationally related to 
the states’ legitimate interest in protecting fetal life. 
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Given this array of possibilities, I see no reason to credit the predictive 
claim that if the Supreme Court were to overrule Roe v. Wade, it would or 
could be expected to do so only on the last, most apparently modest ground.  
Assertions about how the Court would overrule Roe if it should decide to do so 
are necessarily speculative. 
Even if a Supreme Court decision overruling Roe were initially written in 
the most modest possible terms, however, it would still be hasty and 
misleading to conclude that the decision would have no effect on constitutional 
jurisprudence protecting fundamental rights outside the sphere of abortion 
rights.  Once again, the claim’s fallacy would lie in its representation of a 
hazardous prediction as a matter of fact.  In truth, the consequences of a 
decision to overrule Roe would not be knowable in advance, no matter how 
narrowly the Court’s opinion might be written. 
Regardless of the wording of an overruling decision and regardless of the 
immediate intentions of the Supreme Court, it is imaginable, though by no 
means certain, that a renunciation of Roe v. Wade would initiate a new epoch 
of constitutional law, largely through its effect on the surrounding culture and 
practice of constitutional politics.  A Supreme Court decision overturning Roe 
would reflect what academic commentators call “popular constitutionalism.”145  
Popular constitutionalism is a broad, loose concept that subsumes diverse 
positions linked only by their shared view that the beliefs and activities of the 
American public not only do, but should, help to determine the resolution of 
constitutional issues.  In its tamer versions, popular constitutionalism may 
imply no more than that surrounding political and cultural currents inevitably 
affect the way that the courts, and especially the Supreme Court, develop 
constitutional law.146  One such influence comes through presidential 
nominations and congressional confirmations of Supreme Court Justices and 
other federal judges.  The investiture of these functions in politically 
accountable officials tends to produce a federal judiciary whose overall 
outlook lies within the mainstream of public opinion.147  Proponents of 
relatively weaker versions of popular constitutionalism also emphasize that 
judges and Justices are likely to attend to the public’s sense of what is fair and 
prudent in rendering decisions on matters of high salience.148 
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A more robust version of popular constitutionalism, recently championed 
by Dean Larry Kramer, maintains that “the People themselves,” rather than the 
courts, have both the right and the power to make ultimate decisions about 
constitutional issues.149  In claiming that the people should decide 
constitutional questions, Kramer does not mean that the courts should not issue 
judgments in constitutional cases.  He maintains, instead, that other institutions 
of government, which are themselves representatives of the people, should not 
necessarily feel bound to accept Supreme Court decisions as ultimately 
authoritative.150  More affirmatively, the people should demand through 
politics that the Court bring its decisions in line with the popular will. 
Political resistance to Roe v. Wade epitomizes the kind of robust popular 
constitutionalism that Kramer valorizes.151  From the time the Supreme Court 
first decided Roe, Congress and the state legislatures have recurrently enacted 
legislation aimed at provoking a judicial reconsideration, and either a softening 
or a total abandonment, of the abortion rights that Roe recognized.  The 
Republican Party has made the appointment of pro-life, anti-Roe judges a 
plank in its political platform.152  Presidents have made nominations to the 
Supreme Court with the aim of getting Roe reversed, and the Senate has 
confirmed nominees with full awareness of the Presidents’ aims. 
As the triumphant culmination of one exercise in robust popular 
constitutionalism, the toppling of Roe v. Wade could imaginably introduce a 
new equilibrium in which political agitation surrounding constitutional issues 
would recede.  It is equally imaginable, however, that the demise of Roe would 
inspire other popular constitutional movements, whether similar or dissimilar 
in their political allegiances, and encourage a burgeoning of the attitude that 
Supreme Court decisions are properly viewed as provisional only, subject to 
appeal to the court of public opinion.  However politicized the process of 
nomination and confirmation of federal judges is now, it might become more 
so, especially if, as I have argued, a decision to overrule Roe framed large, 
contentious new issues about the meaning of state and national citizenship. 
In offering these reflections, I want to emphasize that I am not making any 
prediction about whether the overruling of Roe v. Wade would do more to spur 
or to deflate robust popular constitutionalism.  Nor do I mean to take a stand 
about whether an increase of robust popular constitutionalism should be 
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welcomed or decried.  Although I believe that the Supreme Court’s historic 
role in our constitutional order has been a force more for good than for bad, I 
agree with those who maintain that in cases of reasonable disagreement, it is 
fairer, all else equal, to allow decision-making power to be shared by the 
people as a whole than to concentrate power in nine Supreme Court Justices.153  
My sole and simple point is that the overruling of Roe v. Wade could easily 
trigger significant changes in our political and constitutional cultures. 
It is also readily imaginable that the overruling of Roe would have subtle, 
unforeseeable impacts on the sitting Justices of the Supreme Court and on the 
institutional climate in which they function.  It is possible, for example, that 
the success of a popular constitutional movement in toppling Roe could have a 
chastening, moderating effect on the judiciary.  The felt lesson might be that 
the Court should avoid further adventurism, however adventurism might be 
defined, in much the same way that the Court retreated into relatively 
deferential quiescence in the years following the collapse of its resistance to 
New Deal regulatory legislation.154 
It is equally possible, however, to imagine that the overruling of Roe v. 
Wade, brought about through popular constitutionalism, would subtly 
encourage judges and Justices to re-imagine themselves, not as occupants of a 
role defined by norms of legal craft and constitutional tradition, but as tribunes 
of the people, vested with a mandate to remake constitutional law to fit the 
people’s liking.  Over the course of its history, Roe has developed 
progressively broader and deeper roots in constitutional doctrine.  It has been 
reaffirmed repeatedly, most famously and dramatically in Planned Parenthood 
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,155 and the number of decisions that 
have either relied on Roe or Casey or at least assumed their validity has 
increased with the passage of time.156  However intended initially, the 
overturning of Roe would be a judicially bold act that could (though it would 
not necessarily) prove exhilarating to those who did the deed.  Many of those 
who have tasted power come to relish its exercise.  If the Court overturned Roe 
tomorrow, what other contested monuments of our constitutional law might 
appear ripe for abandonment the day after?  It is impossible to know. 
As I have perhaps intimated already, however, Lawrence v. Texas,157 which 
invalidated a state anti-sodomy statute on the ground that it threatened the 
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dignity and equal citizenship of homosexuals, would appear especially 
vulnerable.  Lawrence relied heavily on the reasoning of Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey,158 which itself reaffirmed Roe’s “central holding” and thus would 
presumably be overruled by any decision in which Roe was overruled.  What is 
more, if Lawrence were overruled, then Romer v. Evans,159 which invalidated a 
state constitutional amendment on the ground that it discriminated 
impermissibly against homosexuals, could easily appear vulnerable too.  The 
rationales of the two decisions, both written by Justice Kennedy and both 
emphasizing homosexuals’ rights to equal status with other citizens, are largely 
overlapping.  If Lawrence fell, the Court might therefore conclude, ultimately 
if not immediately, that Romer could or should not stand either. 
In offering these musings, I want to emphasize, once again, that I am not 
predicting that the overruling of Roe would necessarily lead to the overruling 
of any other case.  My more cautious claim is that in constitutional law, as in 
the world generally, there is always the potential for a butterfly effect.  
Although nothing is certain, no one should doubt that a decision overturning 
Roe v. Wade would be the constitutional equivalent of a very large butterfly. 
CONCLUSION 
From a constitutional point of view, getting rid of Roe v. Wade could not 
be neat and simple.  In the wake of an overruling decision would come a 
multitude of legal issues, some excruciatingly hard.  Rather than attempting to 
summarize the issues that the Supreme Court might need to confront if Roe 
were overruled, I want to conclude instead by re-emphasizing two themes. 
One involves the so-called culture wars.  Abortion is a fiercely divisive 
issue.  There is certainly an attraction to getting the Supreme Court disengaged 
from a controversy that calls upon it to take sides that will predictably be 
viewed as partisan by those who disagree with the Court’s substantive 
decisions.  As I have argued, however, abstention from the culture wars would 
not be a live option for the national judiciary in a post-Roe world, especially 
insofar as one state’s attempts to stop its citizens from procuring out-of-state 
abortions would intrude its regulatory power into the territorial jurisdiction of 
another state.  Lines would need to be drawn between the respective regulatory 
jurisdictions of states that wished to ban abortion and of states that sought to 
permit abortion.  In drawing those lines, courts would need to appraise the 
competing state interests.  The obvious but unavoidable awkwardness is that 
differences about how to define, weigh, and accommodate those interests 
would implicate issues close to the heart of our deepest cultural divisions.  
Given the nature of the constitutional debate, courts could not simultaneously 
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retreat to neutral ground and fulfill their constitutional obligations, even if Roe 
v. Wade should be overruled. 
Another, connected theme has involved state and national citizenship.  Roe 
nationalized abortion rights to a considerable extent.  Accordingly, a decision 
overruling Roe would narrow the rights that flow from national citizenship.  
Less obviously, such a decision would also generate deep issues about the 
significance of state citizenship and about the capacity of states to regulate the 
efforts of their citizens to procure abortions, even when they do so out of state.  
In states that made abortion a crime, issues would also arise about how far, if at 
all, speech advertising and promoting abortion could be criminalized, the 
national guarantees of the First Amendment notwithstanding. 
As I have emphasized repeatedly, my aim is not to judge whether Roe v. 
Wade should be overruled.  But when contemplating the possible eradication 
of that jurisprudential landmark, we ought to have a clear-eyed view of the 
constitutional consequences.  If Roe were to go, it would not go gently.  
Instead, its departure would roil the waters of constitutional law and 
surrounding politics and churn up a host of new controversies.  No matter how 
much the Supreme Court might wish to extricate itself from abortion debates, it 
could not imaginably do so. 
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